Problems of Communism

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An Empire in Convulsion

IN the last few weeks the world has been subjected to an avalanche of staggering events the outcome of which is not yet in sight. What had initially borne the earmarks of an accelerated but orderly retreat from rigid Stalinism soon degenerated into a nightmarish bloodbath, still rampant as these lines are written. After making concessions to "national communism" in Poland, Moscow is now reported to be subjecting its government to various forms of pressure, all designed to forestall extensive administrative and economic reforms. Soon after the official promise to withdraw its troops from the satellites, the Soviet dictatorship brands the thousands of men, women, and children fighting and dying in Hungary as "fascists," "landlords," and "counterrevolutionaries," brazenly defending its bloody intervention as the "correct position of proletarian internationalism."

Will the brutal suppression of the Hungarian revolution and strong-arm tactics in Poland spell the end of the "thaw" that has been spreading through the length and breadth of the Soviet empire? Or will there be a return to a process of controlled relaxation once the Soviet Union is convinced that it is not threatened with immediate annihilation and that naked force is no substitute for rational economic and political policies? These are some of the outstanding questions that are anxiously raised at this time. But before some tentative answers are advanced, a brief sketch of the forces that underlie the current crisis would seem to be in order.

UNTIL the eruption of violence at the end of October, the Stalinist system at home and abroad showed every sign of a gradual and inexorable disintegration. Seen in retrospect, this disintegration was due to a number of causes, all of them important, though asserting themselves at different times, and with differing effects. The first lay in the fact that the social and economic factors that did much to determine Stalinist policies have been playing an ever-diminishing role. Chief among these factors was the overall backwardness of Russian society, and its atomization following the upheavals of 1914–1918. This is not to say, as some commentators do, that these factors made totalitarianism inevitable, but to the extent that they did exist, they surely helped to shape the specific form of Stalinist totalitarianism. To industralize the country in the direction and with the speed desired by the dictatorship, forced collectivization had to be employed. Wholesale collectivization, in turn, was intimately connected with coercion, bloodshed, ruthlessness, a centralized economy—all hallmarks of the Stalinist system. Once Russia emerged as a powerful and in many respects modern industrial state, some of its original social and economic compulsions were bound to become less and less operative.

As Soviet society has changed, so has the Soviet dictatorship. And what was useful and rational—from the Kremlin's point of view—became less useful, less rational—indeed, at times, even dangerous. The Stalin reign was marked by a number of features, which in the hands of an arbitrary dictator eventually became liabilities rather than assets. The Stalin cult, which at first played a rational role in legitimizing the rule of the Leader, was gradually getting out of hand. Suspicion and terror, which at first helped to consolidate the Stalinist power apparatus, finally threatened to become a socially disruptive and uncontrollable force. Massive coercion, which facilitated the process of collectivization and the creation of Soviet military might, became, as time went on, an impediment to the growth of the Soviet economy. To eradicate these irrational elements, which comprised what may be called the "senescence of Stalinism," became in many respects an imperative from which the new Soviet leadership could only shrink at its own peril.

The reasons for the post-Stalin changes would thus seem to be a mixture of objective and subjective factors, of irresistible forces as well as conscious engineering, of expediential adaptation to reality as well as deliberate attempts to steer it along new channels. They cannot be explained entirely either as tactical

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shifts or as policies deliberately staged by this or that faction within the Soviet hierarchy in their internecine struggle for power. Both elements undoubtedly play their roles in the present situation, but though the stress on incentives to peasants, in lieu of continuous repression, may be regarded as a change in tactics, the same surely cannot apply to the dismantling of concentration camps in the USSR. And while Malenkov may very well have represented the interests of certain groups in Soviet society, and his downfall the rise of a different group, the fact remains that it was his successor, Khrushchev, at first considered an arch-Stalinist, who gave the anti-Stalin campaign its greatest impetus. Khrushchev's reversal (or, say, that of Ochab in Poland) may be pure opportunism, but it has important roots that go beyond the machinations of the individuals in question.

The disintegration of Stalinism, described above, has until now been controlled—and even, as pointed out, desired and initiated—by the Soviet leadership. Internally, this situation still holds true. There has been a significant degree of continuity of post-Stalin measures in the USSR in almost all areas of public life. Even the Khrushchev assault on Stalin may be regarded essentially as an intensification of a process that took three years to mature. Stalinism, after all, had become not only a symbol, not only a "cult," but a method of government, a mode of behavior, a system of thought and action that had penetrated into every institutional facet of Soviet society. "The cult of the individual fettered the search of the inquiring mind and set limits on scientific research," says *Partiinaia Zhizn*, No. 9, of May 1956. "The cult of the individual did grave harm to the country's defensive capacity," declares *Krasnaia Zvezda* of July 19. "As a result of the cult of the individual negative phenomena have become rooted in the work of party and Soviet bodies and in the methods of leadership," according to *Kommunist*, No. 10, August 1956. There is no reason to doubt the underlying truth of these statements—or understatements . . . And there is good reason to believe that the Soviet leaders had come to the conclusion that many of these problems must be tackled—and tackled head-on, through the customary method of ' shturmovschina," or all-out assault.

IT is externally, however, that the breakdown of Stalinism has become so conspicuous these past few months—and so dramatic. The use of force in Hungary can only be understood against the background of the manifest failure of Stalinist policy in Eastern Europe, and in relation to the numerous concessions that the Soviets have been compelled to make to their erstwhile underlings. Furthermore, Moscow's decision to drown the Hungarian revolution in blood, taken after a period of hesitation and attempted conciliation, must not obscure the fact that in the long run Stalinism would prove viable only at an enormous price, one that the Soviet leaders may well not be willing to pay.

The Soviet concessions to Poland, and the declaration of October 30 promising to discuss with the governments of the "peoples republics" the question of the withdrawal of Soviet advisers and troops, underlined Moscow's readiness to come to terms with the liberalization movement sweeping through Eastern Europe—provided it did not go too far. Clearly, the Hungarian revolution, responsive to its own elemental forces and not to the limits prescribed in Moscow, did go "too far", and consequently Soviet Russia resorted to wholesale terror in order to suppress it and prevent its entire East European empire from falling apart. But does this mean a full-scale return to Stalinist methods *via-à-vis* the satellites, and the complete end of controlled liberalization? As grim and tragic as the situation may look at this moment, it would seem as if the answer to this question should be in the negative. For one thing, Stalinism has *never* meant brute force alone, but force enveloped in a myth of "popular support," the "elimination of elements hostile to the masses," *etc.* Soviet seizure of Hungary—or for that matter any other satellite—did not occur overnight, but progressed piecemeal, through the use of what Rakosi had dubbed "salami tactics," *i. e.*, the gradual liquidation of all existing or potential enemy forces, under all sorts of hypocritical pretexts, and to the tune of innumerable promises and ideological rationalizations. The promises have now been exploded, the pretexts shown up for what they were, the ideological rationalizations pulverized by the simple fact that force, and only brute force, was used to gain what threats, cajolery and lies could not achieve. The Soviets realize that a return to a Stalinist position could be accomplished only through the use of the essence, but not the trappings of Stalinist politics; and it was on the trappings that their appeal had depended so much in the past. Now it is obvious, however, that never again will the captive peoples in Eastern Europe accept Soviet promises and prevarications. And it is doubtful whether the Soviet leaders would consider it either desirable or practical to keep down by brute force alone what will undoubtedly develop into a continuous movement of passive resistance.

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In addition, whatever the innate Soviet contempt for either the views of Communist parties abroad, or for world opinion at large, the fact remains that they can ill afford to disregard them altogether. In particular, they cannot, in the long run, afford to antagonize the very powers in Asia whom they so blatantly have been trying to woo. Their present action in Hungary may have been obscured—at least as far as some parts of the world are concerned—by Anglo-French action in the Middle East. But a *continuous* reign of terror cannot be hidden—or rationalized—forever. Already the Communist world has been rocked by mass defections (*e. g.*, in Italy), angry protests from leaders (in Austria), and genuine soul-searching among intellectural elements (in France). And while Asian opinion, by and large, has thus far been insufficiently outraged by the Soviet massacre in Hungary, it is safe to assume that repercussions in that part of the world will sooner or later make themselves felt as well.

All things considered, therefore, it is possible to assume that Moscow will eventually have to come to terms with reality—and make the best of it. For the outstanding feature of the present situation is that it represents a natural result of the erosion of an empire that began with the death of the man who had held it together—and that cannot easily be brought to a halt. The same forces that have generated the disintegration of the Stalinist system at home are also at work in the Stalinist empire *in toto*. And as in the case of internal destalinization, the Soviet leaders—whoever they will be—will probably have to reconcile themselves to existing trends—in this case, the growing independence of their former vassals. The process of reconciliation has, for the time being, suffered a setback, and it is more than likely that in the immediate future there will be a resurgence of the type of approach and mentality that the world had grown accustomed to under the reign of the omnipotent Stalin. The duration and precise nature of this approach will depend to a significant extent on the kind of reception it receives from the powers that have thus far successfully resisted Communist expansion in Europe and Asia. Should the Soviet leaders see that the flare-up of militancy is—as in the case of Stalinist aggression—leading them into a blind alley, the earlier pressures for gradual relaxation will be bound to reassert themselves with even greater vigor than hitherto. It will be at that time that we may see the further disintegration of the Stalinist Monolith and the emergence of a new *genre* of communism—in the ultimate sense no less abhorrent to the goals and ideals of a democratic society, but certainly different from the type the world has known until now.

A. B

What, generally speaking, are the symptoms of a revolutionary situation? . . .

1. When it is impossible for the ruling classes to maintain their rule in an unchanged form; when there is a crisis in one form or another among the upper classes, a crisis in the policy of the ruling class which causes fissures through which the discontent and indignation of the oppressed classes burst forth . . .

2. When the want and suffering of the oppressed classes have become more acute than usual.

3. When, as a consequence of the above causes, there is a considerable increase in the activity of the masses who in "peace time" quietly allow themselves to be robbed, but who in turbulent times are drawn both by the circumstance of the crisis and by the "upper classes" themselves into independent historical action.

—V. I. Lenin, "Opportunism and the Collapse of the Second International," 1916.

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Ferment in the Communist Orbit

Editors' Note: *As this issue was being prepared for press, it was already apparent that the destalinization campaign initiated by Moscow last February had set off a chain reaction of increasing ferment throughout the Communist world. Nowhere, however, was there anticipation of the lightning eruption of that ferment into the terrible yet inspiring drama which has unfolded in Eastern Europe in recent weeks, shaking the Communist world to its foundations. In the immediacy of this crisis, it is impossible to predict what the repercussions of events in Hungary and Poland will be. One thing alone is certain: the profound heroism of the Hungarian people in their struggle for freedom, and the brutal suppression of that revolt by Russian tanks and guns, has revealed, as nothing before, the naked force on which Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe depends.*

In the article below, the eminent political analyst Richard Lowenthal reviews the developments which led up to the East European crisis and offers a tentative analysis of its possible impact on Kremlin policy. As he shows, the question is no longer one of defining the limits of post-Stalin "democratization" and "liberalization" but of wondering whether these "Khrushchev" policies can survive at all. On the other hand, events in Poland leave room for hope that the powerful impetus toward greater freedom from Soviet domination, put in motion by the "destalinization" program, will be carried forward. A second article by Alexander Korab discusses the developing Polish situation up to the time of Mr. Gomulka's assumption of power.

The less dramatic but nevertheless significant impact of "destalinization" on Communist China is discussed in a third article by G. F. Hudson, who also addresses himself to the problem of future Sino-Soviet relations. The latter two articles were written prior to the crisis in Hungary, though an attempt has been made to add crucial information where necessary.

Revolution Over Eastern Europe

By RICHARD LOWENTHAL

TWELVE years after the Russian armies first established Soviet rule over Eastern Europe, the empire founded by Stalin has been shaken by a revolutionary earthquake of altogether unimagined force and scope. The tragic outcome of the Hungarian revolution must not blind us to the fact that both in Hungary and Poland, essentially revolutionary movements for the first time not only have broken the surface of totalitarian uniformity, but have in their different ways achieved an unprecedented measure of success. Moreover, they have done so entirely on the basis of the crises and contradictions which had developed within the Soviet orbit, without the aid of international conflict and indeed despite international diversions favorable to the Soviet rulers. The "national Communist" canalization of the Polish movement and the bloody suppression of the Hungarian uprising may restore outward calm for the moment, but the Soviet East European empire will never be the same again. Nor can this shattering blow fail to have profound repercussions both on Soviet relations with the non-Communist world and on political developments within the Soviet Union itself.

What was new in the October revolutions of 1956 was not that the national and social grievances of two enslaved peoples fused in a powerful outburst of mass revolt; that had happened before—in Pilsen and in the whole of Eastern Germany in June 1953 and in Poznan in June 1956. What was new—and, indeed, as unexpected as it was unprecedented—was that the popular movement for freedom managed in Poland to impose on the Communist Party, and through it on

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the Polish administration and army, a new leadership committed to national independence and to thoroughgoing changes in internal and economic policy. In Hungary the movement succeeded in virtually taking over the national army and, with its help, overthrowing the Communist Party dictatorship, splitting the hitherto ruling party, and creating a democratic national government committed to internal freedom and international neutrality. An attempt to understand how these events were possible is clearly vital to our judgment of the future prospects of Soviet rule in Europe.

The Breakdown of Kremlin Control

THE major common factor in the background of both the Polish and Hungarian events was clearly the weakening of Soviet authority both within the international Communist movement in general and within the satellite states in particular. That weakening, which has proceeded slowly and gradually ever since the death of Stalin and the loosening of economic and police controls in the satellites, was greatly accelerated by two major events—the Belgrade Declaration of 1955, by which the Soviet rulers recognized Yugoslavia's right to her "own road to socialism", and the "secret" Khrushchev attack on Stalin at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU last February.

The Soviet leaders had not, of course, intended that the national independence which they recognized as inevitable for the regimes of Mao Tse-tung and Tito should apply to the satellite states, on which "socialism" had been imposed by Soviet bayonets. All they meant to grant to these countries was a replacement of detailed control through mixed companies, Soviet secret police agents, and "advisers" on all levels, by a less irksome and less costly but by no means less efficient control through party, military and economic ties at the top. As for Khrushchev's speech on "the cult of the individual", it was clearly made for strictly domestic reasons, and the hope was to confine its international repercussions to a minimum.

Yet the rehabilitation of Tito, and consequently of the victims of "Titoist" purges in the satellites, could not fail to discredit the most loyal exponents of Soviet supremacy in these countries at the very time when many direct Soviet agents were being withdrawn; and the tendency to extend this discredit of pro-Moscow elements to their Russian masters was of necessity powerfully strengthened by Khrushchev's disclosure and condemnation of Stalin's methods of rule. Furthermore, the view (formulated most boldly by Togliatti) that the Soviet system, having produced clear symptoms of degeneration, could no longer be regarded as the sole model for Communists everywhere, must have gained large numbers of adherents among Communists in the satellite states—and must have furnished arguments to far larger numbers of non-Communists in their hitherto silent opposition to both Soviet rule and Soviet-type dictatorship.

During the spring of 1956 this weakening of Soviet authority found visible expression in the astonishing outburst of free criticism in the Polish Communist and non-party press, in the openly critical discussions conducted before ever larger audiences of writers, students and young officers in the "Petoefi" circle in Budapest, and—on a smaller scale—in critical statements by writers and student groups in other satellite states.

When this wave of criticism reached its culmination in the Poznan riots of June 28, the Soviet Communist leaders, by now alarmed and in part alerted by the more "orthodox" Communist leaders abroad, tried to reassert their claim to worldwide leadership and to warn against the spread of "nationalist deviations" in the name of "proletarian internationalism." The Declaration of June 30 issued by the Soviet Communist Central Committee, as well as several articles in *Pravda* and Premier Bulganin's speech in July, were all part of an effort to stem the tide. So was Moscow's insistence that Rakosi—who had to be sacrificed as Hungarian party boss because of his former role in the fight against Tito and in the Rajk trial—be replaced by the equally unconditional supporter of Moscow's authority, Erno Geroe, and that the leader of the "national-minded" Communists, Imre Nagy, be kept out.

The Struggle to Reassert Authority

IN the circumstances, however, Moscow's effort at tightening the reins was subject to a threefold limitation. In the first place, authority once shaken cannot be restored at will, and the attempt is liable to meet resistance unless backed by overwhelming force. In the second place, the use or open threat of force was not possible without jeopardizing Soviet efforts to woo the "uncommitted nations" and endangering Moscow's dearly-bought understanding with Tito, if not the overall strategy of "peaceful coexistence". Finally, even a non-violent attempt to reassert Soviet supremacy over the satellites was bound to cause renewed friction with the Yugoslavs. Up to the time of his Moscow visit, Tito had carefully refrained from encouraging "Titoist" currents in the satellites and had insisted on working through the Soviet

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government. But during the visit he made it clear that he expected the Soviets themselves to promote some further loosening of control as part of his price for closer party relations—that is, for his return to the "socialist camp".

During August and September all of these limitations on Moscow's attempt to return to a semi-Stalinist attitude in relation to the satellites became visible. The Polish Communist Central Committee, caught after the Poznan riots between its desire to regain the confidence of the people and the Soviet demand for drastic action against the "imperialist agents" who had caused the trouble, preferred by a majority to yield to popular pressure and to defy Soviet advice. For the first time, the Soviet leaders found they had lost control of a formerly faithful satellite party, and they were reduced to organizing a minority faction—the so-called "Natolin group" which embraced Soviet supporters in the army and in a number of important posts in the party and trade union bureaucracy.

At the same time, the Yugoslav press resumed open criticism of the insufficient pace of "destalinization" in Hungary, Bulgaria and Albania, while a Yugoslav court condemned as a traitor a former "Cominformist" who had returned from exile in Moscow. The Soviet Communist Party's response was to warn the satellite parties by "secret" circular that the Yugoslavs, though generally "progressive" and "friendly", were not true Marxist-Leninists, were tainted by "social-democratic confusion," and thus were not to be taken as a model. The Yugoslavs, promptly learning of the document, reacted with further criticism.

By the end of September, this friction resulted in Mr. Khrushchev's surprise visit to Yugoslavia, followed by Tito's visit to Yalta. The basic issues still dividing the Soviet and Yugoslav Communists remained unresolved, but Tito agreed to speed up his resumption of contacts with other Communist parties, including the Hungarian Party, in return for a more outspoken condemnation of the latter's past direction and the rehabilitation of Imre Nagy.

Probably in part as a result of these negotiations, there followed a number of dynamic developments in Hungary. Early in October—on the eve of the departure for Belgrade of a Hungarian party delegation headed by Geroe—Rajk and the other "martyrs" of the Titoist purge were solemnly reburied in Budapest, and former Defense Minister Farkas was arrested for his role in the frame-up of Rajk. It was also publicly admitted that Rakosi had not resigned for health reasons in July but had been deposed for his "violations of legality." Finally, Nagy was readmitted to the party on the understanding that he would observe discipline but would be entitled to a re-examination of the political charges which had led to his fall and subsequent expulsion. With these developments, the authority of the Soviet leaders and of Geroe took yet another knock in Hungary.

The Polish Revolt

MEANTIME events were moving in Poland. Totalitarian regimes can stand up to the most bitter discontent of the masses for a long time; but once authority gets weakened or divided at the top, long-standing grievances suddenly become motors of action. It is at the moment of loosening, of "liberalization," that the masses start moving and refuse to tolerate the oppressive gesture which no longer seems to be part of an unalterable order of things.

The factional struggle within the Polish Communist leadership had quickly become a competition for mass influence of an almost "democratic" character. As the "liberalizers" stood for freedom of expression and economic reform as well as for national independence in internal affairs, the "Natolin" faction, headed by General Witaszewski, Marshal Rokossovsky's chief political commissar, offered anti-semitism as a substitute for nationalism, and demagogic wage increases as a substitute for greater freedom and economic reform. It was this competition for mass influence which led to the resurgence of "Wieslaw" Gomulka, the former "national Communist" leader who, though released from prison, had been politically condemned for his views by the whole party leadership as late as last April. Gomulka became the arbiter of the emergent factional struggle simply because by his former resistance to forced collectivization and to Soviet control, he had become the one Communist leader whose patriotism was trusted by the non-Communist masses. Herein lies the vital difference between Gomulka's victory and "Titoism": Tito defied Moscow while in control of a party and state machine created by himself; Gomulka was enabled by a popular movement to dictate his terms to a party whose machine had been packed by his enemies for many years, and this in defiance of an occupying power!

The terms which Gomulka laid down before agreeing to resume leadership of the party which had expelled and imprisoned him ranged him squarely with the "liberalizers": no economic or anti-semitic demagogy, complete frankness on the economic plight of the country, a sharp turn away from enforced collectivization, moves toward ending enforced agricultural deliveries, dissolution of the machine tractor stations, gradual steps to decentralize economic planning, cautious experiments in "workers' control",

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new relations with the USSR on a basis of political and economic equality, and removal of Moscow's stooges from the party leadership. It was this last point—to wit, the intended exclusion of Marshal Rokossovsky from the party Politburo—which led to the decisive showdown with the Soviet leaders on October 19.

When Messrs. Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Molotov and Kaganovich descended on Warsaw, to the accompaniment of troop movements, at the moment of the decisive meeting of the Polish Central Committee, they were convinced that a show of determination and strength would be sufficient to restore the subordination of at least a majority of the Polish Politburo. Instead, they were confronted by a majority of men determined to risk the wrath of Moscow rather than that of the Polish people. Thus the Soviet leaders had to choose between using naked force or admitting Poland's internal independence. It was still the independence of a Communist Poland willing to stand loyally by the Soviet alliance. And though the liberalizing pressures which had brought about the change were far broader than those associated with Yugoslav Titoism, the Polish leaders were willing, for obvious geographical and international reasons, to keep the new regime within the limits of Titoism. After a few days of hesitation, the Soviet leaders decided to refrain from using force and to accept the accomplished fact.

For months, Poland's intellectuals had talked excitedly of their "second revolution", though in fact there had been no shift in the control of the decisive levers of power. But on the weekend of October 20–21 there was indeed a revolution in Poland: on these days Gomulka resumed the party leadership and removed the Soviet stooges from it, following up his action by corresponding changes in the army. The weakening of Soviet authority and the restraints imposed by "competitive coexistence" on the use of force had caused the Soviet leaders to accept, for the first time in their history, the peaceful overthrow of a satellite regime.

The Tragedy of Hungary

THE news of Polish events hit a Hungary already in ferment after the concessions made to the "national Communist" elements a week before—the above-mentioned solemn reburial of Rajk, the arrest of Farkas, and the partial rehabilitation of Nagy. When Geroe returned from Yugoslavia on October 23,

Free Hungary Speaks

THE PEOPLE . . .
Today we are burying our dead in Miskolc. . . . Rakosi! Geroe and other oppressors of the people! Can you hear the weeping at the funeral . . . ? Can you see the gravestones . . . ? Answer! Because the people will find you wherever you are hiding! Do not believe . . . that we shall be annihilated! . . . We have swept away the dirty surge of the tide which has brought you to the surface and now, here, at the graves of Hungarian martyrs, we believe firmly that . . . liberty . . . can never again be covered up.

—Radio Miskolc, October 28, 1956.

THE ARMY . . .
The treacherous occupation forces attacked Budapest and several other cities in the country. The battle is on in Pecs, Szekesfehervar, Dunafoldvar, and Veszperer. Hungarians as one man are fighting against the intruders and will keep on fighting for the sacred cause of the Hungarian revolution up to their last drop of blood. . . . Hungarians, do not permit the Russian troops to carry out massacres in our precious country. The fight is still on. . . . The garrison troops of Dunanpentele will hold out to the last man! Death to the Soviet occupiers!

—Radio Dunanpentele, November 4, 1956.

THE NATIVE COMMUNIST . . .
Comrades . . . the place of every true Hungarian Communist is on the barricades . . . [in] the struggle against brutal imperialism. We true Hungarian Communists . . . must frustrate the activities of any party which . . . tries to serve only Russian imperialism and to keep Hungary in a colonial status. Soviet leaders must realize that . . . even if they subjugate the nation, those of us who remain alive . . . will wage an underground war against them. . . . We shall do our best to present a clear picture of the Russians' colonial rule not only to our Russian comrades but to our comrades in Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, and in the free countries. We shall tell them that the Soviets do not want communism, for the trampling underfoot of free nations is not communism. . . . Those who cooperate with the occupying colonial power . . . are traitors not only to Hungary but to communism, and we shall fight them. Comrades, the place of every honest Hungarian Communist is on the barricades.

—Radio Rajk, November 5, 1956.

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he was greeted by the news that a students' demonstration was going on which had been initiated without party permission and was persisting, despite a party ban, with the support of the leaders of the intellectual "Petœfi" circle. At first calling for comparatively moderate reforms, the demonstration, carried forward under Hungarian and Polish national flags, quickly assumed both an unprecedented scale and a marked anti-Soviet note. By evening Geroe felt forced to broadcast a warning against "counter-revolutionary nationalism", which only served to increase anger among the demonstrators. The secret police became jittery and started to fire into the crowd. By nightfall, groups of students and workers had started to fight back with weapons supplied by Hungarian Army soldiers and officers who had joined them.

Overnight, the pro-Soviet party leaders realized that a serious uprising had started, that the army was unwilling to fight the people, and that the secret police was unable to cope with the situation. By the morning of the 24th, the regime had called on the Soviet Army for help and at the same time announced the appointment of Imre Nagy as Prime Minister in an effort to calm the population. The intervention of Soviet troops was the insufferable final blow, provoking widespread and desperate resistance. The appeals of Nagy made no impact on the aroused population; neither did the announcement on the following day that Geroe had been replaced as party Secretary by Janos Kadar (a former participant in the Rakosi regime but later its victim). Army units and officers seemed to have joined the insurgents in increasing numbers during the following days, while the government, isolated by the Budapest uprising, lost control of large parts of the country. Revolutionary workers' and students' "councils" were set up in several regions, everywhere putting the withdrawal of Soviet troops at the head of their demands.

By Sunday October 28, the Hungarian people had clearly succeeded in their revolution. The Nagy government, now no longer a facade for the pro-Soviet group among the party leaders, proclaimed a cease-fire and called for a withdrawal of Soviet forces from the battered capital. Negotiations for broadening the government leadership with non-Communist elements started in earnest. The Soviet command actually started to extricate its troops from Budapest, and the government promised both to dissolve the secret police, replacing it with a newly recruited popular police force, and to negotiate with the USSR for a general withdrawal of Soviet forces from the country. Gradually, fighting subsided.

The Fateful Return to Brute Force

THE Soviet leaders were now faced with the question of whether to accept this second revolutionary *fait accompli*, achieved this time in open conflict with their occupation forces and in circumstances far more damaging to their prestige than in the Polish situation. For two more days they seem to have hesitated: reports concerning the machinations of "counter-revolutionaries" in Hungary ceased, and some publicity was given to Nagy's new version that the victorious popular movement was a natural reaction to the mistakes and crimes of the former Hungarian Communist leadership. This policy, motivated apparently by Moscow's desire to save what at first it thought could be saved—*i. e.*, the principle of Communist rule and Hungarian membership in the Warsaw Pact—found its most far-reaching expression in the Soviet government declaration broadcast from Moscow on October 30, which generally proclaimed the need for greater independence and equality for the member states of the "socialist camp", and specifically expressed readiness to discuss the need for further stationing of Soviet troops in Poland, Hungary and Rumania within the framework of the Warsaw Pact.

By the time this declaration was broadcast, however, a new Soviet policy for Hungary was emerging. For by October 30, the pre-1947 democratic parties of the workers and peasants had already been reconstituted in Hungary, and Nagy had announced the abandonment of the one-party regime, the transformation of his government into a genuine coalition, and his pledge to hold free elections. He had also spoken of Hungary's desire to leave the Warsaw Pact and to become neutral under international guarantee on the Austrian model. Meantime the command of the Hungarian army and air force had been taken over by "revolutionary councils", one of which threatened the Soviet forces with bombardment in case of refusal to withdraw.

By October 30 at the latest, it was thus clear to the Soviet leaders that nothing whatever would remain of their Hungarian position if they gave in. The local alternatives were brute force or total defeat. The Hungarian revolution, led not by "counter-revolutionary" émigrés but by workers, students reared under the Communist regime, and soldiers of its own army, had within a week evolved from a program of "Titoist" independence and reform to a pledge of full democracy, combining workers' councils with trade union freedom, an end to both collectivization and forced deliveries in agriculture, and a clean breakaway from the Soviet bloc. If the USSR had

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given in, Hungary would have become not a new Poland or a new Yugoslavia, but a new Austria or at best a new Finland.

To tolerate such a development, as a result of a revolutionary movement directed against Soviet control, would have started a chain reaction throughout the satellite empire. It also would have inflicted a fatal blow on the Communists' confidence in the irreversible character of all their conquests, allegedly guaranteed by the laws of history. All considerations of local strategy as well as of ideology thus favored the decision to crush the Hungarian revolution in blood.

The only factor which might have stood in the way of such a decision was the effect that Soviet repressive action was sure to have on the uncommitted countries of Asia. This consideration, implicit in the whole strategy of competitive coexistence, had clearly exercised a restraining effect on Moscow up to the moment of its fateful decision. But just as clearly, that effect was bound to reach its limits at the point at which the threat of the loss of the Soviet empire loomed larger than the threat of the loss of sympathies in Asia. The Soviet leaders would rather accept a temporary setback in the competition for uncommitted countries than put up with the total loss of their own possessions in half a continent. Moreover, at the critical moment the effect of this restraining factor was largely nullified owing to the Anglo-French action against Egypt, which Moscow could expect would divert the attention of non-committed Asia from Soviet repression in Eastern Europe. The Soviet leaders thus chose to save their empire for the time being by the wholesale butchery of the Hungarian people.

Prospects for the Future

WHAT are the likely consequences of this decision? In the first place, the dilemma of the policy of "relaxation" in satellite Europe has not been solved. The puppet government of Hungary installed by the Soviets under Mr. Kadar had to start by splitting even the Hungarian Communist Party, and it seems at the time of writing to have no army, no civil service and no following; yet it is already trying to promise the Hungarian people that most of the gains of their revolution would be respected, and that even the Soviet forces will withdraw "after the restoration of order." However untrustworthy these promises may be, they testify to the unwillingness of the Soviets to cancel their whole relaxation policy officially and to resume a kind of direct rule. Yet such is the united and desperate resistance of the people of Hungary that Moscow may yet be compelled to do just that, even resorting to the Stalinist method of mass deportation—and what part of recent reforms would then survive anywhere in Eastern Europe?

Secondly, the very need to use brutal force in Hungary represents a massive failure for some of the policies initiated by Mr. Khrushchev. The cost of reconciliation with Tito and of destalinization at home has proved far higher than he calculated; the gain, even in the case of Tito, has proved extremely limited and doubtful. The attempt at an "ideological offensive" by means of flexibility has failed, and Khrushchev as its main exponent must be weakened to a corresponding extent. By contrast, the advocates of reliance on Soviet armed might and particularly the political exponents of army influence must be correspondingly strengthened. Whatever the extent of the internal frictions the Soviet leadership is probably united in regarding the Hungarian uprising and the Anglo-French intervention against Egypt as parallel challenges requiring a demonstrative reassertion of Soviet prestige.

What form this reassertion should take will be the major question at issue. The advocates of naked force certainly will be applying the strongest pressure for a return to military rigidity and uncompromising hostility to the West that Soviet Russia has experienced since the death of Stalin. But it is hard to imagine how such a return could take place without a major shift of power within the Soviet leadership—a shift which would run contrary to the profound tendency toward relaxation resulting from the internal development of Soviet society.

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Poland: The Search for Independence

By ALEXANDER KORAB

THE tumultuous events surrounding the reelection of Wladyslaw Gomulka to the Politburo of the Polish government and to the position of Secretary-General of the party cast in bold relief the less sensational developments of the past two years, as Poland moved gradually to reach her present position of qualified independence of action. While they moved with greater speed after the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Party (February 1956), Polish intellectuals and party theoreticians had in effect been searching out a unique "road to socialism"—although their quest was not so defined—for over a year prior to the Congress. In the process, they had subjected their most basic theories and practices to penetrating criticism. For example, in January 1955 the Communist Workers' Party Central Committee decided to "democratize" the Security Police and to restrict its supreme powers. During the summer a campaign preceding trade union elections was enlivened by "a soul-searching criticism of managerial and trade union practices."[1] Even more significant was a discussion on the connection between Communist doctrine and intellectual creativity which raged in the fall of the year among the leading party ideologists. The most prominent of the debaters, Adam Schaff, won almost unanimous support for his condemnation of the "injurious personality cult" and the consequent "degeneration of the Leninist norms of party life." Although these statements did not immediately result in significant practical changes in the Communist dictatorship, the atmosphere created was unmistakably favorable to the later resolutions of the CPSU Congress.

Another factor which had as great an effect on post-Congress political developments in Poland was the death in Moscow, on March 12, 1956, immediately following the Congress, of Boleslaw Bierut, leader of the Polish party. A skillful tactician, Bierut's career was distinguished by his exceptional ability to straddle the fence between Moscow's imperial objectives and the desires of the overwhelming majority of Polish public opinion, which is both anti-Communist and anti-Russian. Bierut's death marked the end of one-man dictatorship in Poland. There arose a dualism in the Warsaw ruling system, with control divided between the party on the one hand—under the leadership of Edward Ochab, Bierut's successor—and the government on the other—headed by Premier Jozef Cyrankiewicz. In the period immediately following the Twentieth Congress and before the Poznan riots they represented respectively the conservative-Stalinist and the "liberal" factions of the Polish party. As these factions struggled for supremacy, neither clearly ascendant, each with his supporters in the periodic press, the revelation of Khrushchev's "secret" speech burst on the Polish scene, adding heat to the already free-wheeling discussion.

The Personality Cult Under Fire

WELL advanced in criticizing violations of the "Leninist norms of party life," the Polish Communists proceeded without too many personal recriminations to the heart of the matter: the reasons for the development of the personality cult in the USSR and the search for means to control its effects in Poland. The party philosopher Adam Schaff spoke for a large segment of the Polish party when he wrote in the pages of the party theoretical journal, *Nowe Drogi*, that it was not enough to condemn Stalin for being a certain type of person and possessing certain characteristics:

It is clear that such a presentation of the problem would be a demonology which is alien to the spirit and position of Marxism. It is doubtless a great practical political achievement that the distortions connected with the person of Stalin, which we term the personality cult, were described and that the individual facts of these distortions were

[1] For a complete discussion see Kazimierz Grzybowski, "Trade Unions in Communist Poland," *Problems of Communism*, No. 5 (September–October), 1956.

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exposed. But now one must pose an important question: Why did these distortions develop and how was this possible? [2]

The Polish theoretician called to mind that during the years of Stalin's ascendancy—that is, from about 1924 on—the inner-party situation was such that it promoted the restriction of democracy and thus made his dictatorship possible. Moreover, he added:

. . . these occurrences took place in a country that was economically backward . . . in a country that was backward both socially and culturally, in a country with a centuries-old tradition of autocracy, in a country with substantial vestiges of feudalism which were favorable to the personality cult . . . [3]

It was an easy jump from this frank and not inaccurate description of the Russian milieu to a condemnation of the manner in which Russo-Polish relations had been presented. For years discussions of this problem had been strictly taboo; and the Poles chafed while the "generous" Soviet Union was depicted as Poland's benefactor and virtually the source of her national life and culture. Restrictions having been loosened, an old Communist, Jadwiga Siekerska, felt free to condemn the unjust and subjective way Soviet publications were presenting past Russo-Polish relations. She was bitter, for example, that Soworow, the hangman of the Warsaw suburb Praga, had been shown in a positive light. She also criticized attempts to justify the Tsar's wars of conquest and to glorify the Soviet Union.[4] The publicist Zbigniew Florczak was even more direct. In calling for a new interpretation of Russo-Polish relations since 1949 he said:

We must finally come to the belief that we are an independent state . . . In other words, it is a question of national dignity. In the Stalinist epoch the feeling of national dignity did not receive sufficient recognition in the relations between the countries in our camp.[5]

The goal of Polish "liberal" Communists was thus explicitly stated: independence from Soviet dictation.

Searching Questions and Candid Comments

THE explanation of why the "cult" developed in the Soviet Union, however satisfying and accurate it may be, left the more important question of how to deal with its effects in Poland still to be resolved. Public discussion on this subject soon embraced almost every one of Poland's leading intellectuals, the most vocal of whom were the literary critics and writers who had resisted the subordination of cultural life all along.[6] The best known in this category were the literary critic Professor Jan Kott, the writers Artur Sandauer, Julian Przybos, Antoni Slonimski, and Adam Wazyk. A number of Warsaw journalists joined them, too, notably Henryk Korotynski and Kamila Chylinska from the editorial staff of the daily newspaper *Zycie Warszawy*. On the staff of *Trybuna Ludu* people such as Roman Jurys and Edda Werfel advocated unfettered criticism of past conditions. Wladyslaw Bienkowski, the chief ideologist of the party in the first postwar years of the Gomulka period, became a vehement disputant. And finally a group of Polish students and intellectual young Communists associated with the weekly journal *Po prostu* emerged on the stage with revolutionary elan.

The discussion in the spring and early summer of 1956 demanded in particular freedom for the growth of other schools of art than socialist realism and increased cultural contacts with the West, rehabilitation of the non-Communist resistance movement of World War II, and the transformation of the Polish Sejm into a true parliament. This was the most frequent demand: the restoration of freedom of discussion. "The most important thing," said the old Communist, Roman Jurys, "is for political and economic life to take place entirely in the open. The shadow of secrecy has proved to be injurious, for behind it crimes against the party and the people were committed . . ." [7] The writer Antoni Slonimski depicted his program for the future even more dramatically:

I do not think there will be any improvement attained by means of any sort of organizational measures. . . . Only a real democratization of public life, the restoration of public opinion and a return from fideism to rationalism . . . can save us from Caesarism. . . . There are in Poland young forces, healthy minds and characters, who have been waiting for this moment of change. Today they must have their say.[8]

The Warsaw press carried an unusually frank discussion of the past practices of parliamentary life in Communist Poland. One of the participants, the well-known journalist and member of Parliament, Edmund Osmanczyk, wrote as follows:

Let us say it frankly; so far the principles of a people's parliament have not been realized in any of the countries which are building socialism. And we have no reason to conceal the fact that we, too, have not done this. Our Parliament does not have a critical attitude toward the

[2] No. 4, April 1956.
[3] *Ibid.*
[4] *Nowe Drogi*, No. 6, June 1956.
[5] *Nowa Kultura*, Warsaw, No. 15, April 8, 1956.
[6] For a recent discussion of newest developments on the Polish literary scene see Czeslaw Milosz, "Poland: Voices of Disillusion," *Problems of Communism*, No. 3 (May–June), 1956.
[7] *Nowe Drogi*, No. 3, March 1956.
[8] *Przeglad Kulturalny*, Warsaw, No. 14, April 4, 1956.

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proposed laws suggested by the administration. The various committees often meet only the day before the Parliament is convened, or even in the intermissions between the sessions.[9]

It was apparent at the spring meeting of the Sejm in Warsaw (April 22–28) that the government had been following the general discussion and specifically the criticisms of the Sejm. For the first time since the uproarious sessions with Mikolajczyk's opposition Peasant Party in 1947, an attempt was made to carry on thorough parliamentary debates. For the first time in as many years key economic and social problems were discussed publicly, and the government promised a number of economic and social reforms. The amnesty passed at this session, which affected 200,000 persons, was conceived of as a vital concession to the sentiments of the population.

In a Communist state outspoken discussion and concrete demands are possible only under the cover of powerful protectors. The anti-Stalinist "rebels" in the Polish government and party gathered round Premier Cyrankiewicz, and under his direction a very extensive reshuffling of ministers was begun. Several particularly rigid Stalinists—such as Stanislaw Radkiewicz, former Chief of the Security Police and since 1954 Minister of State Farms, Foreign Minister Stanislaw Skrzeszewski, Minister of Culture Wlodzimierz Sokorski, and above all the "gray eminence" of the Stalinist period, Deputy Prime Minister Jakub Berman—were forced out of the government, to be replaced by adherents of Prime Minister Cyrankiewicz' liberalization policy.[10]

The Stalinist Rearguard

DURING the spring and early summer, however, the followers of Stalinism in Poland tried to obstruct the rebellion among the intellectuals as well as the plans of the Cyrankiewicz group for domestic and social reforms. Edward Ochab, First Secretary of the party, was at that time the main exponent of the conservative-Stalinist forces. In an article published in *Pravda*[11] and reprinted in *Trybuna Ludu*,[12] Ochab accused the critics of totalitarian dictatorship of having commented upon the Twentieth CPSU Congress in a "spirit inimical to the party" and of "trying to undermine confidence in the correctness of the political line of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union." He announced that the party would not tolerate any attempts "to undermine the friendship between the Polish and Soviet peoples."

Although Ochab's threats made no significant impression in Warsaw he met with considerable success in the provinces, where the Stalinist party apparatus was still dominant. Little party tsars, in control of the provincial party press, led the attack on the anti-Stalinist critics. Suddenly "indignant" Communists spoke up, abusing the revolutionary sentiments of the rebels in the capital. "There are anarchist tendencies in our discussion," wrote *Glos Olsztynski*.[13] Another provincial paper, *Nowiny Rzeszowskie*, spoke angrily about the "unreliable statements" made by persons who wanted a party congress convened, or even wanted to "change the party leadership."[14]

Ochab's position in control of the party apparatus was sufficiently powerful, in short, to negate the practical efforts of the Cyrankiewicz faction. The demands of the workers and of the intelligentsia for reforms remained unanswered. It is entirely understandable, then, that the workers became increasingly restless. Such official and highly publicized decisions as those relaxing the draconic labor-discipline regulations did little to remedy the actual situation in the industrial plants and the workers were quite aware of this fact. Discontent must have been particularly acute in the Stalin Plant in Poznan, where for decades the workers were known as determined fighters for their social and economic rights.

The Poznan Riots Evaluated

THE Poznan uprising of June 28, 1956, was the culmination of the movement of protest which spread throughout Poland following the Twentieth Congress. But for a time it placed in question the whole parallel trend toward destalinization. The alternatives were clearly drawn. Would the Stalinist group led by the party leader Ochab succeed in reversing this trend, or would the policy of relaxations and concessions advocated by Prime Minister Cyrankiewicz prevail in spite of the Poznan riots? The first official reaction to the events in Poznan seemed to reflect the Stalinist standpoint. The official communique of June 28 stated:

. . . for some time now imperialist agents and a reactionary underground movement have been trying to incite uprisings against the people's rule, owing to economic difficulties and grievances in certain factories in Poznan.

Trybuna Ludu supported the thesis of a "bloody provocation" and wrote that the "well-organized agents' headquarters chose the industrial-fair city and the

[9] *Zycie Warszawy*, March 25–26, 1956.

[10] Adam Rapacki was appointed Foreign Minister, Karol Kuryluk, Minister of Culture, and Eugeniusz Stawinski replaced Berman.

[11] "Leninist Norms of Party Life Must Absolutely be Retained," April 29, 1956.

[12] April 30, 1956.

[13] May 12, 1956.

[14] May 10, 1956.

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time for provoking the disorders." [15] The party spoke of a close connection between the "provocation" and the activity of a "foreign headquarters."

Within one week, however, the central newspapers dropped the allegation that foreign provocateurs were responsible for the Poznan riots. An editorial in *Trybuna Ludu*, entitled "First Conclusions," re-evaluated the Poznan incidents, making a distinction between a legal strike movement by the Poznan workers and the "illegal acts of violence" which followed. The official party newspaper explained that there had been two entirely different movements in Poznan. The beginning and the first phase of the uprising were termed the consequences of the entirely justified dissatisfaction of the Poznan workers. It was only later that the "hostile forces" entered and succeeded in transforming the strike into an "armed provocation."[16]

What explains this change and the obvious defeat of the Stalinists in the party? It was simply that the Poznan uprising and the unrepentant ferment which spread throughout Poland in the succeeding days revealed the regime's political, social, and economic weaknesses so clearly that the majority of the leadership feared the outbreak of revolutionary incidents far beyond the scope of the riots. In this crisis, concession won out over repression.

Under the pressure of public opinion, which now included the majority of the party, even First Party Secretary Ochab had to abandon his original position. In a speech of July 19, 1956, to the Seventh Plenary Session of the party Central Committee, he adopted the standpoint of the moderate group:

The Seventh Plenary Session of the Central Committee is holding its meetings three weeks after the painful events of Poznan. In investigating the reasons for these occurrences it would be wrong to have mainly in view the machinations of provocateurs and imperialist agents. Rather one must first look for the social roots of what happened, which has become a warning signal for our whole party. For it shows that the relations between the Party and various members of the working class are seriously disturbed . . .[17]

The party headquarters in Moscow was obviously alarmed at the strength of the moderate group and its determined resolve to bow to popular demands. During a state visit to Poland, Soviet Prime Minister Bulganin seized the occasion of a Liberation Day address to sound a warning on the meaning of the Poznan riots:

The latest events in Poznan, instigated by enemy agents, afford fresh evidence that international reactionary circles still cling to their mad projects for the restoration of a capitalist order in the socialist countries. We must never forget this for a single minute. Heedlessness under these circumstances would be inexcusable . . .[18]

This direct intervention by the Soviet Prime Minister failed in its objective, however, as did the more direct October 19–20 visit to the meeting of the Polish party Central Committee by the Soviet "delegation" headed by Nikita Khrushchev. On July 31—one week after Bulganin's speech—*Trybuna Ludu* published various resolutions passed at the Seventh Plenary Session of the party Central Committee, including one on the Poznan uprising.[19] Instigation and the counter-revolutionary activities of an alleged underground movement were plainly relegated to a secondary place. The party leadership openly admitted that dissatisfaction among the workers of the Stalin Plant in Poznan was particularly justified because their legitimate demands had not been met. The party admitted that an atmosphere of discontent had arisen among the working people "because of disillusionment over the unfulfilled hopes for a substantial improvement in the standard of living."

Striking at the Roots

THE underlying economic causes of Poznan were revealed even more clearly in a second resolution released by the Central Committee on the state of the Polish economy, disclosing the non-fulfillment of many goals set for the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1950–55), particularly in the agricultural sector and in consumer goods production. Industrial production, too, was well below the planned level.

Just two weeks before the publication of the resolution, the Polish economist Oskar Lange, a member of the Cyrankiewicz faction, had published an astonishingly frank analysis of Poland's economic situation. Noting that sharp imbalances had occurred in various sectors of the Polish economy, Lange proposed an emergency reorganization of the Polish national economy. Under his plan, "all available reserves were to be mobilized to improve the supply of necessities of life available to the working class and to raise its standard of living." Further, fresh "incentives for the restoration of agricultural production" were to be inaugurated. In addition, investments were to be restricted, the manual trades restored, and domestic and foreign commerce reorganized.[20]

Lange's proposed line of action was further developed in various other resolutions of the Seventh

[15] June 29, 1956.
[16] July 6, 1956.
[17] *Trybuna Ludu*, July 20, 1956.
[18] *Pravda*, Moscow, July 22, 1956.
[19] July 31, 1956.
[20] *Zycie Gospodarcze*, Warsaw, No. 14, July 16, 1956.

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Plenary Session of the party Central Committee, of the Eighth Plenary Session of the Central Council of Polish Trade Unions and of the September session of the Sejm. Their essential recommendations may be summarized as follows:

1. An emergency economic program for 1956–57 should be drafted.
2. A rigid policy should be put into effect limiting investments to projects already under construction or projects which would attain maximum economic impact if placed in operation at an early date.
3. Economic administrative agencies should be decentralized, and individual enterprises and their personnel accorded more initiative.
4. The Polish export program should be modified; in particular coal exports should be restricted and the domestic supply improved.
5. A part of the facilities devoted to armaments production should be diverted to the production of consumer goods.
6. Trade unions and workers' councils should be given a greater share in determining the production plans of enterprises, and, in conjunction with the abrogation of the Law on Labor Discipline,[21] material incentives to workers should be increased.

Wladyslaw Gomulka's forthright speech of October 20 to the Central Committee of the Polish party indicates that the leadership understands the importance of following through with economic reforms. Admitting that production was higher on private farms than on collectives, Gomulka proposed that credits to unsuccessful collectives be cut off. He also suggested that the policy of compulsory deliveries of agricultural produce be reviewed and that the directive powers of the Machine-Tractor Stations be reduced. At the same time he promised that more attention would be paid to consumer goods and to housing. It was "absurd," he said, to speak of "provocation" as the cause of the Poznan riots. The workers' justified demands for better living conditions would have to be met.[22]

Side by side with the "new look at" the economic program, the regime made a number of political moves designed to stimulate fresh initiative and thereby overcome the "dispiritedness and apathy" of which Lange spoke. First among these has been the successful effort to enlist Wladyslaw Gomulka in behalf of the new policy. Gomulka, who had been purged from his position at the time of the 1948 break between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia for advocating an "independent Polish approach to socialism", finds that his "heresy" has once again become "orthodoxy"—hence his present appeal for the party leaders. Gomulka's prestige among Polish farmers—which he gained as a firm opponent of the policy of forced collectivization—further strengthened his hand, and he made the most of his position, refusing throughout protracted negotiations to accept a minor role. Only in mid-September, after his rival and enemy Hilary Minc had been removed from the cabinet and from top party posts,[23] did Gomulka finally come to an understanding with the Politburo and consent to play an active political role in the country. The Politburo conference of October 15 took up all practical matters in regard to Gomulka's

[21] *Bulletin of the Military Mission of the People's Republic of Poland in Germany*, (Berlin), No. 1502, August 3, 1956; No. 1506, August 31, 1956; No. 1507, September 7, 1956.

[22] *Trybuna Ludu*, October 20–22, 1956.

[23] *Ibid.*, October 10, 1956.

rys. Juliusz Puchalski

KROPLOMIERZ

THE MEDICINE DROPPER

Caption on dropper: Truth
Caption on Pot: Public Opinion

From *Szpilki*, Warsaw, April 15, 1956.

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comeback,[24] and the Eighth Plenary Session of the Central Committee was thus presented with the simple task of formalizing Gomulka's full rehabilitation. Once again Secretary-General of the Polish Party, he is now the actual leader of every aspect of Polish political life.

The Parliamentary Road

AN aspect of the process of political reform which may assume entirely new dimensions in the light of Gomulka's victory is the move to reform the Sejm. Throughout 1956 efforts were made to broaden the popular base of the Sejm. The regime tried to increase the appeal of the so-called National Front. The August 12 to 15 plenary session of the All-Polish Committee of the National Front appealed to the national and patriotic sentiments of the people and promised to sweep away the current "habits of bureaucratic government, of political formalism and distrust of the individual." [25]

At the same time the Communist Party leaders are trying to instill new life into the almost defunct "satellite" parties, such as the pseudo-liberal Democratic Party and the pseudo-agrarian United Farmers Party. To this end, negotiations took place at the end of July between the Politburo of the Communist Party and the leaders of the Democratic and the United Farmers' parties.[26]

Perhaps most important, however, the regime has promised a new electoral law. The term of the Sejm "elected" in 1952 ends in October, and Gomulka has guaranteed that new elections will be held in January 1957. The September session of the Sejm organized a committee to draft a new electoral law, consisting of 27 deputies from the Communist United Workers' Party, seven unaffiliated scientists and writers, six deputies of the United Farmers Party, four deputies of the Democratic Party and two deputies of the so-called "Progressive Catholics." Several members of the Committee feel that a new electoral law is not enough without basic reform of parliamentary practices. Julian Hochfeld, former socialist and Marxist theorist who only recently emerged from comparative obscurity in the Stalinist period, spoke for this group and for a vast body of public opinion when he addressed the September session of the Sejm:

The question is can we create the forms and customs which would enable the Sejm effectively to discharge its functions of legislation and review. I believe that in the light of our actual circumstances, this problem is a hundred times more important than the question of the electoral law or of the recall of deputies . . . . There is no question that much has already been done in this direction. Nevertheless . . . situations still arise which threaten a return to the era that muzzled the citizen's conscience. It was an unhappy era, and although nothing can relieve us of our responsibility for it, we nevertheless must do everything to prevent a return to former conditions.[27]

Can Communism Reform Itself?

AS this article is being written the situation in Poland is much too fluid to warrant confident predictions of the outcome of events. The Sejm, for example, has not yet voted on a new electoral law. Nevertheless, the situation is sufficiently clear to permit examination of its elements. The basic problem is, of course, to determine whether the reforms in Poland make a return to former conditions impossible. The Stalinists in the party leadership were undoubtedly seriously weakened by the rapprochement between Ochab and Cyrankiewicz, and the circumstances surrounding Gomulka's return to power clearly reveal the precariousness of their present position. Their last hope of maintaining influence was removed with the dramatic dismissal from the party Politburo of Soviet Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky, Polish Defense Minister and symbol of Soviet domination over Poland. The Stalinist rank-and-file are now predominantly middle- and lower-level party bureaucrats, men who rose during the Stalinist period and see in the liberalization measures a danger to their present positions. Around these men have gathered the right-wing reactionaries and anti-Semites, who have always been a feature of political life in Poland.

By contrast, the rank-and-file of the liberal faction consists largely of intellectuals, in the main from Warsaw and some from Lodz; but this group derives its tremendous strength from the popular discontent its reforms are trying to assuage. The danger to its position is that the popular will may carry the movement beyond the limits permissible under even the liberal Polish interpretation of Marxism. Indeed, it is noteworthy that the entire discussion—even the defense at the Poznan trials—has been carried on in Marxian terms. If it can be said with a degree of confidence that Stalinism is finished in Poland, still there can be no doubt that the basic structure of the people's democracy is meant by the present leaders to be a permanent thing.

The present situation in Poland therefore casts a clear light on the dilemma confronting reform movements in Communist states: How much liberalization,

[24] *Ibid.*, October 16, 1956.

[25] *Ibid.*, August 15, 1956.

[26] *Bulletin of the Military Mission of the People's Republic of Poland in Germany* (Berlin), No. 1503, August 10,1956.

[27] *Trybuna Ludu*, September 8, 1956.

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

Caption Above: Some leaders of the National Front limit themselves to representational functions only.

Caption Below: Where are the representatives of the National Front? —They're carrying them in now . . .

From *Szpilki*, Warsaw, September 2, 1956.

how much democratization is possible before the structure of the system is endangered? Though a certain amount of freedom of discussion has been permitted, the fact remains that so far no anti-Communist or anti-Marxist voices are participating. Even the comparatively freer April and September (1956) sessions of the Sejm, as well as the July negotiations with the "satellite" parties, offer clear evidence that the regime will not permit reform of the Sejm to include the formation of opposition parties with distinct political programs. Gomulka's speech of October 20 made this point particularly clear. On the one hand he seemed to offer Poland the realities of democratic political life. "The election laws must enable people to elect and not merely to vote," he said, and he proposed that the various candidates stump the nation "with the whole truth about life in Poland." But he went on to say that the National Front would put forward "one common election program" and that the Communist Party would "recommend" that the "allied" parties select "candidates . . . who will care for the jointly elaborated election program not only in words . . ." The implications are obvious. Thus the dilemma of the Polish reformers serves to emphasize both the impotence of parliamentarism without full-fledged opposition parties and the impossibility that a Communist regime will allow real opposition to take political forms.

All things considered, then, the maximum change which can be expected in Poland is the emergence of a kind of Polish Titoism, which would entail granting the workers and the trade unions much more authority in making local decisions and which would lessen the stress on industrial expansion. The demands for economic reform summarized above, especially those for decentralizing economic agencies and granting more autonomy to trade unions and workers' councils, show the unmistakable influence of the Yugoslav example.[28] The Poles could, in addition, go beyond the Yugoslavs by easing relations between church and state and by allowing cultural and artistic trends free expression. It is moreover probable that the electoral system will be altered so that elections to the Sejm will present various candidates—without an organized opposition party, of course. A Sejm elected in such a manner would be a body in which serious discussions on purely practical matters could take place.

In the final analysis, the extent to which the plans of the "liberals" can be realized depends on two factors. Of primary importance is the attitude of the Soviet leaders. Much depends on their willingness to allow Poland to seek her own road even if it leads away from Moscow. The political acumen of the Polish leaders, as they attempt to satisfy both the Soviet Union and the resurgent Polish masses, will be crucial in the months to come. Convinced Communists all, men who received their training in the Stalin era, they have now pledged themselves to lead Poland along the "parliamentary road to communism." Yet even their most liberal pronouncements leave no doubt that the Polish people can expect no real freedom under communism.

[28] A delegation of the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party visited Belgrade from August 25 to September 2, 1956. This delegation included the Central Committee division directors responsible for social questions, for governmental matters, and for commerce and finance. These men studied the Yugoslav economic system and trade unions. Cf. *Trybuna Ludu*, September 3, 1956.

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Moscow and Peiping: Seeds of Conflict?

By G. F. HUDSON

MORE significant than any contrasts of ethnic disposition or cultural inheritance, the root difference between Communist China and the Soviet Union is simply that communism has held the central state power in Russia since 1917, and in China only since 1949. In relation to Communist doctrine, this means that China is at an earlier stage of the road which every proletarian revolution must travel in order to reach the historically predetermined Marxist goal.

Communist doctrine, to be sure, permits tactical variations for the attainment of socialism, but these do not alter the principle that a nation can qualify as socialist only when it has eliminated private enterprise from trade, industry and agriculture. The Soviet Union officially claimed to have reached this stage in 1934 after the general liquidation of the New Economic Policy in the towns and the collectivization of peasant farming throughout the country. China has not yet reached it despite the greatly increased tempo of social and economic transformation during the last year.

That China must pass through the same stages of evolution already pioneered by the USSR was recognized by the Chinese Communist leadership from the start of the new regime. Liu Shao-ch'i, second only to Mao as CPC theoretician, declared in October 1949 that the party particularly emphasized Sino-Soviet cooperation because "the path already traversed by the Soviet people is exactly the path we should follow." The revolution in China, he claimed, had succeeded because the Chinese Communists had learned from Soviet Russia as their teacher; henceforth, in the building of socialism, they must also learn from Soviet experience.[1]

[1] Quoted in Henry Wei, *China and Soviet Russia*, D. Van Nostrand, New York, 1956, p. 292.

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There is no reason to suppose that Liu's statements were inspired merely by motives of flattery. Mao, Liu and their associates were voluntary converts to a doctrine which postulated just such a stage-by-stage advance toward the final goal. It was precisely the successes and achievements of Stalinist Russia which made the Communist revolutionary ideal appear practically attainable to its Chinese adherents and fired them with determination to tread the same path of socialist evolution. Moreover, the Chinese Communist leaders were fully aware that Soviet connivance in Manchuria in 1945–46 had been a decisive factor in the ultimate success of their struggle against the Kuomintang Now that they were masters of the Chinese mainland, they looked to the Soviet Union not only for continued guidance along the road of Marxist-Leninist progress, but also for the technical and economic aid without which industrialization would be impossible.

Weaknesses in the Sino-Soviet Tie

FOR the leaders themselves, this dependence upon Soviet Russia as mentor, model and source of material aid—involving recognition of her more advanced development and hence superiority—was least difficult to accept. But among the Chinese masses with their traditional suspicion of all foreigners, the intelligentsia with their attachments to the West, and even the rank-and-file of the Communist Party with their high self-confidence and spirit of self-sufficiency, the idea of reliance on the Soviet Union had to be put across by means of intensive, high-powered propaganda. Thus, the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association became one of the principal subsidiary organizations of the CPC, with thousands of local branches up and down the country. Through lectures, exhibitions, films, books and magazines, the association sought to glorify the USSR and its achievements; among other things it had, by the summer of 1953, printed nearly seven million copies of Stalin's works in Chinese translation.

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The Soviet Communists naturally were gratified by the attitude of the Peiping leadership, but fundamentally they did not regard it as any more than their due. They recognized that China was too large and important to be bracketed with the "people's democracies" of Eastern Europe, and that care must be taken not to offend the susceptibilities of so proud a nation. Still, they regarded China as a country both economically and politically backward, which could not be expected to achieve the transition to socialism for many years. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union would not be standing still but moving on from socialism to communism. This higher stage of evolution, which Western observers generally regard as having little practical significance, is in fact of great importance as a teleological concept. It serves not only to keep up the dynamism of the party within the Soviet Union, but also to assert Soviet superiority over the junior partners of the Communist bloc still struggling along the road to socialism which the USSR had finished traversing 22 years ago.

With so much deference on one side and so strong an assumption of superiority on the other, the pupil-teacher relationship between Communist China and the Soviet Union seemed established for an indefinite period. There were, however, two essential conditions for a partnership on this basis to work satisfactorily. One was that the Soviet Communists should cooperate in preserving the panegyric of their own history and not embarrass their Chinese admirers by defaming it. The other was that Peiping and Moscow should agree on their respective spheres of influence for the conduct of both state diplomacy and Communist revolutionary activities abroad.

Neither of these conditions has been adequately fulfilled in recent months, not so much because of any change in the Chinese Communist attitude as because of the new developments in Soviet policy. On the one hand, the CPSU's retrospective turn against Stalin has tended to vitiate Peiping's exaltation of Soviet experience of the Stalinist epoch as the model for China. On the other, continuing accord on external spheres of influence cannot but be prejudiced by the marked extension of Soviet diplomatic activity in Asian areas which are a natural field of Chinese political interest.

China and Destalinization

THE attack on Stalin at the Twentieth CPSU Congress clearly took the Chinese party leaders by surprise. Chu Teh, attending as a fraternal delegate, delivered a speech at the start of the congress which referred to Stalin in terms indicating that he had no inkling of what was about to happen. Togliatti, leader of the Italian CP, has declared that he, too, went to Moscow without any foreknowledge of the impending onslaught on the memory of the man who, for nearly thirty years, had been not only the effective ruler of the Soviet Union but also the central figure of the international Communist movement.

There are only two possible explanations for this evident failure of the Soviet party to take the leaders of the foreign Communist parties into its confidence regarding so momentous a step, which could not conceivably be regarded as of mere domestic concern to the Soviet Union. Either the attack was not premeditated and the decision to launch it was taken by the Soviet leadership only at the last moment—perhaps even during the congress—or Khrushchev and his colleagues feared that the foreign Communist leaders would oppose the move if informed of it in advance. Whichever of these hypotheses may be correct, and whatever the motives behind the Soviet action, the repudiation of Stalin was presented to the non-Soviet Communist parties as a *fait accompli*, with-

COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP, BUT. . .

That we advocate consolidation of collective leadership is not for the purpose of lowering the function of the individual. . . . The Marxists never deny the functions of outstanding individuals in history. . . . Likewise, the Marxists never deny the function of leading persons in a party.

According to the famous passage of Lenin, leaders are "the most influential and experienced people with the highest prestige. Undoubtedly, their influence, experience and prestige are the valuable treasures of the party, the class and the people." Regarding this point, we members of the Chinese Communist Party are particularly conscious of our personal experiences.

Of course, leaders of such a kind are born naturally through the struggle of the masses . . . [they] do not stand above the masses, but stand amid the masses, not above the party, but in the midst of it. . . . The love and support of leaders are essentially the indications of love and support of the interests of the party, the class and the people, and have nothing in common with worship of an individual.

—From report by Teng Hsiao-ping, Chief Secretary of the Chinese CP Central Committee, to Eighth Party Congress, NCNA, Sept. 16, 1956.

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out consultation and apparently without regard for the consequences it might have for them.

These consequences have been particularly serious for the Chinese party just because of the great efforts it made at home to build up Soviet Russia not only as China's ally and protector in international affairs but as the model for faithful Chinese imitation in the march toward socialism. Moreover, intensive propaganda had led the Chinese generally—not just members of the party—to think of the "great and glorious Soviet Union" as a state which, to be sure, was founded by Lenin, but which above all owes its advance to its present industrial and military strength, including its victory in World War II, to the transcendent genius of Stalin.

Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin—this was the great historic succession, to whose contributions in the formation of Communist doctrine "the thought of Mao" was now added as an appendix. But while Marx, Engels, and Lenin were given their place in the Chinese Communist pantheon, it was Stalin whose name carried the greater weight. The Chinese Communist revolution, indeed, belongs to the Stalin era. Except for a few party veterans, nobody in China has any direct memory of Lenin or of the brief period of collective leadership in the Soviet Union following his death. Nearly all the present members of the Chinese party, as well as the broad masses of the Chinese people who have been living since 1949 under Communist rule, were initiated into a religion of which Stalin was already the virtual god, and in which Mao was elevated to similar status, though on a slightly lower plane.

In the Soviet Union, if the new leadership saw fit, for whatever reason, to repudiate the cult of personality and decanonize Stalin, it at least had something to fall back on — Lenin and the days of the "Troika" when Stalin was not yet undisputed master of the party Central Committee. For the Chinese Communists, however, there is nothing prior to the age of Stalin and Mao, except their obscure beginnings as a mere faction within the Kuomintang; and for the Chinese generally, whether convinced Communists or half-converted camp followers of the new regime, the name of Stalin is indissolubly linked not only with the image of Soviet Russia as model and ally, but also with the victory of Communist power in China itself.

To pull down the Stalinist idol was consequently far more dangerous for the Communist Party position in China than in the USSR itself. Though the Peiping leaders made every effort to conceal it, their embarrassment was obvious enough from their cautious, equivocal handling of the affair.

The Peiping Line on Stalin

IN the first place, the Chinese party leadership has manifestly tried, ever since the Twentieth CPSU Congress, to avoid undue public attention at home to the repudiation of Stalin. The party press studiously refrained from any expression of Chinese Communist views on the issue until early April, several weeks after the end of the congress, while its news reporting of developments abroad connected with destalinization was both sketchy and highly selective.[2] This policy of extreme reticence was relaxed in mid-July with the publication of the first part of an official two-volume *Collection of Criticisms on the Stalin Issue*, which notably excludes the Khrushchev secret speech but does contain many of the major statements by foreign Communist Party spokesmen reacting to it.[3] While the essential facts of the turn against Stalin thus appear to have been made belatedly available to the Chinese public, it is clear that this was done in the way least likely to attract general attention.

The first and most succinct public statement of the Chinese Communist reaction to destalinization was an editorial published in the leading party organ, *Jen-min Jih-pao*, on April 4 and based on "discussions" at an "enlarged" meeting of the CPC Politburo.[4] This declaration, while it paid polite tribute to the "courageous self-criticism" of the CPSU, pursued two main lines of reasoning, both of which bespoke something less than real satisfaction with the unilateral step taken in Moscow.

On the one hand, the declaration sought to minimize the damage done to Stalin's reputation and, in so doing, implicitly reproached the Soviet party leadership for going too far. It stressed that, in the struggle to defend and carry on "the legacy of Leninism," Stalin "proved himself an outstanding cham-

[2] The Twentieth Congress proceedings themselves (except the Khrushchev secret speech) were reported in the Chinese Communist press with due care to keep references to the "cult of the individual" and Stalin's mistakes in the relatively minor, inconspicuous place given them in the original pronouncements. Subsequent press treatment of the issue was limited to the following: March 30, *Pravda* editorial of March 28 reprinted in Peiping newspapers; April 4, editorial in Peiping *Jen-min Jih-pao*, "On Historical Experience Concerning the Dictatorship of the Proletariat"; July 6, CPSU Central Committee resolution of June 30 and Togliatti statement on the resolution carried in Peiping newspapers.

[3] Publication of the first volume by the People's Publishing House was reported by New China News Agency (NCNA), July 16, 1956. Publication of the second volume was reported in Peiping *Jen-min Jih-pao*, September 1. Volume I includes the initial Togliatti interview on destalinization (*Nuovi Argomenti*, No. 20, June 16, 1956), which was suppressed in the Soviet Union and drew a rebuke from the CPSU Central Committee.

[4] Text reported by NCNA, April 4, 1956.

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pion of Marxism-Leninism" and must be credited with "indelible achievements." At the same time, it reduced Stalin's crimes to notably innocuous terms—"serious mistakes in the latter part of his life," "subjective and one-sided thinking," "conceit" and "lack of circumspection."

On the other hand, the declaration laid great stress on the alleged freedom of the Mao regime from the defects ascribed to Stalinist rule in the USSR. "The Chinese Communist Party," it stated, "has waged continuous struggle . . . against elevating the individual above the masses" and based its practice of "correct leadership" on the principle of "The Mass Line."

For intelligent Chinese, however, such reasoning must be remarkably unconvincing in view of what they now have learned of the true nature of Stalin's rule. The similarities between the phenomena of Stalinist Russia and those of contemporary China with its personality cult of Mao, its purges of leaders formerly high in the party hierarchy, its mock trials, forced labor camps and all the other accompaniments of ruthless dictatorial rule must be all too obvious.

As long as such things were covered for the Chinese Communists and their adherents by the prestige of Stalin's Russia, as long as they were regarded as an essential part of the system as practiced in Russia, they could be defended as necessary and ultimately beneficial. Stalin, it could be argued, had been rough and arbitrary in his leadership, but he had thereby cleansed his country of traitors and opportunists, won a great war and made the USSR the strongest power on earth. But now the Chinese were told that Stalin's tyranny had not been necessary at all, that his most eminent victims had been innocent men (or at least not worthy of death), that he had not won the war at all, and that for years he had been an impediment rather than an inspiration to the great achievements of the Soviet people and the Communist Party. How, then, was it possible to justify, from Russian example, the severity of the Mao regime in Communist China?

This points to the essential cause of Peiping's quite evident discomfiture over destalinization, namely its unwillingness—indeed, its inability at the present stage of Communist Chinese development—to effect the relaxation of police and other Stalinist-type pressures which is the necessary corollary of destalinization. For the Soviet leaders such a relaxation is possible without any imminent danger to the dictatorship of the party. Capitalist enterprise and private peasant ownership of land in the USSR have long since been liquidated; the long years of Stalinist terror wiped out all groups capable of resistance to the party's rule; a great modern industrial structure has been built; almost the entire adult population has been indoctrinated from childhood in the Communist philosophy and denied uncontrolled contact with the non-Communist world. In such circumstances the Moscow leadership can afford to respond to popular desire by granting a limited degree of liberalization; in the short run, it stands to gain public support by such action, although there is the longer-term possibility that the relaxation will lead to new difficulties when the meager ration of freedom granted ceases to satisfy the Soviet citizen.

Communist China, on the other hand, is not yet in a position where it can contemplate a similar easing of totalitarian controls. It is at a point of its socialist development roughly corresponding to that of the Soviet Union at the end of the 1920's, that is to say, at the start of the period which witnessed the ruthless carrying out of high-speed industrialization and collectivization of the peasantry, when the policies of the party were imposed by the unlimited use of coercion, when extreme tensions were engendered in society and within the party itself—in short, the period which saw Stalin emerge in the fulness of his despotic power.

Stalinism a Necessity?

CHINA, indeed, is not moving *out* of a Stalin era, but *into* one. The Mao regime finds itself confronted with virtually the same circumstances that faced the Soviet party 28 years ago—low productivity and a backward economy; a population preponderantly composed of peasant proprietors and including a still numerous petty bourgeoisie; an intelligentsia which received its higher education largely American) in pre-Communist days; and a working class more interested in an immediate improvement of its miserably low standards of living than in grandiose construction projects of remote benefit. Like the Stalinist leadership earlier, Peiping proposes to cope with these conditions, not by slowing down, but by speeding up its program of rapid industrialization and socialization of all means of production. Instead of greater freedom, this spells the unavoidable maintenance of an extreme concentration of power; instead of a relaxation it means the continuation, or even intensification, of police terror.

The Stalin era thus provides the Chinese Communist leaders with just the precedents they require at the present stage of their rule. Unfortunately for them, however, the golden age of Stalinist violence and autocracy is no longer respectable by the present

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official standards of the Soviet Union. This situation places them on the horns of a painful dilemma, and the Eighth Congress of the CPC, held in Peiping during the latter part of September, gave fresh evidence of the conflict between the Chinese party's own will and the contemporary trend of Communist international orthodoxy inspired from Moscow.

It is hardly surprising, in view of the great resemblance between the Chinese Communists' adulation of Mao and the worship formerly accorded to Stalin, that the Chinese party leaders showed themselves at the congress to be still very much on the defensive regarding the delicate question of the cult of personality. They dutifully paid perfunctory lip service to the "correctness" of the Twentieth CPSU Congress' action in repudiating the cult, but Stalin's name was discreetly not mentioned in this connection by any of the speakers, whether Chinese or fraternal delegates from other countries. It was notable that the chief Soviet delegate, Anastas Mikoyan, who had been the first to criticize Stalin by name at the Twentieth Congress, now deferred on this point to the sensibilities of his hosts.[5]

The defensive posture of the party leadership was most evident in the equivocal references made to the cult in its application to Communist China. Thus, Deputy Premier Teng Hsiao-ping, reporting on revision of the party constitution, stressed that "for a long time it has been a tradition of our party to make collective and not individual decisions." At the same time, he insisted that Marxism-Leninism never denied "the functions of leading persons in a party" and that "love and support of leaders . . . have nothing in common with worship of an individual." [6] Similarly, Liu Shao-ch'i, senior Vice-Chairman of the CPC Central Committee, qualified his remarks pledging "thorough application" of the collective leadership principle with this justification of Mao's special position:

As everyone knows, the reason why the leader of our party, Comrade Mao Tse-tung, has played the great role of helmsman in our revolution and enjoys high prestige in the whole party . . . is not only that he knows how to integrate the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the actual practice of the Chinese revolution, but also that he firmly believes in the strength and wisdom of the masses, initiates and advocates the mass line in party work, and steadfastly upholds the party's principles of democracy and collective leadership.[7]

Much the same sort of thing, of course, was said about Stalin himself in the days of his power. If he led the party in its domination of the people, he also ruled the party as the special representative of the people, in whose eyes he had been built up by propaganda as the personal embodiment of the revolution. In China, the "mass line" which Mao alone can "initiate" is likewise a concept which sets him above both the party and people. It has nothing to do with representation in the sense of a freely elected leadership, but rather reflects the need for a father-king-god felt by peoples which have never known parliamentary government and for centuries were accustomed to the rule of despotic monarchs. Just as Stalin inherited the autocratic powers of the Tsars, so is Mao the heir of the Son of Heaven. The Chinese Communists cannot do without his higher authority in the present critical period of their rule and will continue the cult of his personality regardless of whatever experiments in oligarchy are carried out in Moscow and nominally subscribed to by themselves.

There is, therefore, no doctrinal split, but a certain discrepancy between the present attitudes of Peiping and Moscow arising from the fact that the Soviet Communists have repudiated, or at least cast a slur upon, just that part of their history which corresponds to the period the Chinese are now passing through. By itself, however, this might not be of serious consequence for Sino-Soviet relations were it not for the fact that the recent external policies of the Kremlin have included a drive to expand Soviet influence in South and Southeast Asia—a move which is far from being in harmony with Chinese Communist aspirations.

Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Asia

THAT Peiping sees itself as ordained and entitled to lead the Communist struggle in Asia is open to little question. After the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic, the Peiping leadership formulated the theory that whereas Soviet Russia, as a former imperialist power, had by its successful revolution set the example for other imperialist powers, *i. e.*, for the nations of the West, China, by carrying through a Marxist revolution in a semi-colonial country, had shown the way to all the colonial and semi-colonial countries of Asia and Africa. The logical implication of this idea was that

[5] While there is no concrete evidence to prove it, the attendance of Mikoyan instead of Khrushchev at the Chinese party congress (the first since 1945) may well have reflected Moscow's awareness of Khrushchev's unpopularity with the Chinese party leadership as a result of his role in defaming Stalin. Mikoyan, who is notably more tactful and has long experience in dealing with the Chinese, was undoubtedly the best person Moscow could send from the viewpoint of soothing ruffled feelings in Peiping.

[6] NCNA, September 17, 1956.

[7] NCNA, September 15, 1956.

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Europe and America should be reserved for Communist activity directed from Moscow, while Peiping should provide the revolutionary leadership for Asia and Africa.

There is no evidence that this principle ever received favorable consideration in Moscow, but it did, for a time, correspond roughly to the working division of labor between the two Communist powers. As a result of postwar events, the Soviet Union was deeply involved in the affairs of Europe and paid relatively little attention to the Middle or Far East. The Korean conflict shifted the storm-center of world affairs to Eastern Asia, but the Soviet Union, despite its original sponsorship of the North Korean Communist state, allowed Peiping to play the hand and gain paramount influence in Pyongyang, evidently out of fear that its own intervention would lead to an all-out Soviet-American war. In Vietnam also, for geographical reasons, Communist China was left to call the tune.

Within the last year, however, a shift in Soviet policy has brought about an entirely new situation in Asia and Africa. A great Soviet diplomatic offensive has been launched with the dual objective of supporting all anti-Western nationalist movements from Morocco to Indonesia and bringing the non-Communist governments in these areas into a measure of dependence upon the USSR. The sinews of this ambitious program have been proffers of arms and economic aid, reinforced by a political "superstructure" of elaborately staged exchanges of state visits by Soviet leaders and the government heads of the countries concerned.

In all this spectacular activity, effective as it has undoubtedly been in promoting the Communist cause internationally, Peiping has very obviously been left out in the cold so far as China's own special political interests are concerned. The reason is not far to seek. Outside the Western democratic camp, it is the Soviet Union, not China, which can supply modern armaments, steel mills and capital goods to the weak and economically retarded countries of Asia and Africa; it is the Soviet Union with its giant modern industry and imposing military power which fascinates the predominantly socialist-predilected intelligentsia in these countries and inspires them with the desire to learn from "the advanced experience of the Soviet Union." Indeed, they look upon China, not as mentor and guide, but essentially as one of themselves—a fellow-struggler along the road of industrialization, a fellow-pupil in the school of Soviet socialized economic progress, and a fellow-competitor for military and economic assistance.

It must be extremely humiliating to Communist China that the manifest superiority of Soviet prestige now extends to India, Burma and Indonesia—all countries which, in the Chinese Communist view, should be looking to Peiping rather than Moscow for counsel, guidance and aid. What makes this still harder for Peiping to stomach is the fact that the Soviet military and economic aid which is cutting out or forestalling the growth of Chinese Communist influence in Asian and African countries must necessarily come out of the stocks on which the Chinese themselves rely. The more that is diverted to Egypt and India, the less will be available to help fulfill Communist China's second Five-Year Plan. The amount of Soviet aid to the Chinese Communists has, from the outset, been disappointingly inadequate, though certainly vital; and now they must wait in line with other applicants that are not even Communist. Thus, the Khrushchev diplomacy, disturbing and embarrassing as it may be to the Western world, does not appear to have been framed with much consideration for the feelings and interests of Moscow's Chinese ally.

The Shape of the Future

IT is, of course, true that there has as yet been no open conflict between Peiping and Moscow, and that an adjustment of respective spheres of influence may be reached by negotiation. Nevertheless, political agreements cannot alter the basic realities of the situation. The strength of Communist China is potential, not actual; the strength of Soviet Russia is actual and therefore must prevail at present wherever the two Communist powers compete for influence, even without any Soviet intention to push China aside. The Afro-Asian primacy of Soviet influence was not manifest as long as Moscow policy remained quiescent toward these regions, but it was bound to assert itself as soon as this quiescence was replaced by an active and aggressive diplomacy.

For the present certainly, there is little that Communist China can do to counteract effectively the mounting Soviet politico-economic campaign in Asia—except perhaps in Ceylon, where the mutual advantage of exchanging Ceylonese rubber for Chinese rice gives China an unusually favorable economic position. Elsewhere Peiping can make only feeble gestures to rival the lordly munificence of Moscow. Some economic aid in the form of capital goods has been promised to Cambodia, for example, but can Communist China really spare such goods when they are desperately needed for the execution of its own second Five-Year Plan? More than likely, Peiping

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either will fail to implement this promise or will have to make it good at the expense of vital requirements of the overstrained Chinese economy.

Whatever resentments and frustration the Chinese Communist leaders may feel in the face of renascent Soviet ambitions in Asia and Peiping's inability to cope with them, these feelings must be stifled as long as China's present condition of extreme dependence on the USSR prevails. The outward solidarity of the two great Communist powers can therefore be expected to continue unbroken for some time, even though the twin major developments in recent Soviet policy—the defamation of Stalin and Stalinism at home, and the unfolding abroad of a concerted effort to bring Asian and African countries within the orbit of Soviet influence—have created underlying stresses in Sino-Soviet relations. Should Communist China fully succeed with its second Five-Year Plan and avoid any serious internal upheaval in the meantime, the Peiping regime is likely to become stronger, less dependent on Moscow, and possibly even capable of extending an appreciable amount of aid to the underdeveloped Asian countries. Under such circumstances, the subsurface stresses could become too sharp to permit further concealment.

Even before this, it is possible that the Chinese Communists may give indirect expression to their displeasure with Moscow by establishing closer links with the Communist parties of Western Europe, particularly with the important semi-independent center of leadership represented by Togliatti. The fact that Togliatti's original, sharply critical comments on the all-out turn against Stalin have been publicized in China despite their suppression in the USSR indicates that Peiping finds common ground with the Italian Communist leader's opposition to arbitrary, unilateral changes in line imposed from Moscow—though this is not at all to say that the Chinese party is nearer in spirit to the Western CP's than to the Soviet.

The new "polycentrism" of the international Communist movement, as proclaimed by Togliatti, does not mean any breakaway—least of all by Communist China—in the direction of reconciliation with Western democracy. All the Communist parties retain their Marxist-Leninist principles, their claim to absolute power for the party, and their fundamental hatred of Western liberalism. They may still be expected to act together as a bloc on any vital international issue such as the Suez crisis.

But there is no longer a unified central direction of the world Communist movement as there used to be. Until his death, Stalin was the accepted leader of all Communists everywhere (except the Yugoslavs after 1948); today Khrushchev is not. Basically Khrushchev is a smaller man without the qualifications to wield Stalin's power. Still he might have carried on the supreme direction of international communism—even if with reduced effect—had he carefully preserved the Stalin myth and ritually established himself as Stalin's legitimate successor. Instead, for reasons which are still obscure but certainly relate to the internal politics of the Soviet Union, he has shattered the myth and broken the sacred succession.

Today, Khrushchev may remain the real boss of the "collective leadership" in Moscow, and the new policies of that leadership may well have furthered the formation of Soviet friendships with Nehru, Sukarno and Nasser such as Stalin could never have achieved. But Khrushchev no longer exercises the high command of the world revolution. It is no longer clear who in the Communist camp is giving orders, and who is taking them. A great and formidable Communist power remains arrayed against the West, but the substitution of a confederacy for the mighty host which but yesterday obeyed a single will is a change that cannot but have far-reaching consequences. There is no one heir to Stalin's empire.

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Recent Soviet Historiography

By ALEXANDER DALLIN

NO other regime has tried so hard and so brazenly to rewrite the past to suit its political needs as has the Soviet Union. Step by step, history has been reduced to an ancillary instrument of propaganda. There is only one official, mandatory version, and with each change of tactics inconvenient historical figures and events (and at times historians, too) are relegated to the Orwellian memory-hole. The reversal in historical interpretation that followed Stalin's death has been somewhat more complex and far reaching than its predecessors, however. By 1953, Soviet historiography—like most other fields of endeavor—had reached the nadir of sterility and rigidity. Personally and professionally insecure, subject to the wiles of charlatans, many a scholar yearned for a breathing-spell and a reassertion of truth.[1]

While it is still too early to judge the full impact of the "new era" by the finished products, it is clear that two trends have converged to produce the present turn in Soviet historical writing. One has been the general climate of greater security and relaxation—characteristic of the more flexible approach of the new rulers. In this spirit of "more breadth, more elasticity, more daring," the historian has finally won an opportunity to voice, with seeming impunity, judgments which heretofore had been but mental reservations.

In addition, however, the new leadership has been as eager as the old to rewrite the past to bolster its own status, to find new heroes and new scapegoats. Even while attacking the Stalinist practice of labeling foes as enemies of the people, Khrushchev calls Beria an enemy of party and state; and while the adulation of Stalin is now dismissed as a despicable "cult of the individual," Lenin is made the object of a similar cult. A byproduct of this officially inspired search for a new legitimacy happens to be increased opportunities for somewhat less distorted writing of history.

This "new era" was not born overnight. While laudatory references to Stalin declined rapidly after his death, most writings continued to present the recent past in Stalinist terms. Continued intolerance and intransigence were mixed inconsistently with revisions of particularly abhorrent interpretations.

Sometime in the winter of 1954–55 a decision seems to have been adopted to end the years of enforced academic isolationism and resume some contacts with the outside world. The Soviet Union agreed to participate in the International Conference of Historical Science in Rome in September 1955, and to join the UNESCO project on the history of science and culture. By mid-1955 the politically opportune position was that "history can nowhere lead an isolated existence." As in the 1920's, limited collaboration was possible even with non-Communists.[2]

At the same time, an increasing sense of personal independence and security among historians was discernible when they were told not to idealize the recent past "as a smooth, linear road, as an utter victory parade," or when, in an instance of courageous integrity, one historian accused another of writing "as if all were clear, as if there were no room for dis-

[1] Despite political dictation, some excellent work has been done, whose scientific worth has been assessed elsewhere at length. See, *e. g.*, Horst Jablonowski in *Historische Zeitschrift*, 1955, nos. 1–2; Gunther Skokl and Georg von Rauch in *Jahrbucher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, 1955, no. 1. The standard Soviet compendium is A. L. Sidorov, *Osnovnye problemi i nekotorye itogi razvitiia istoricheskoi nauki* [The Basic Problems and Some Results of the Development of Historical Science] (Moscow, 1955). On the political background, see Sergius Yakobson, "Post-war Historical Research in the Soviet Union," in *The Soviet Union Since World War II (Annals of the American Academy*, 1949); Klaus Mehnert, *Stalin vs. Marx* (London, 1951); and Bertram D. Wolfe, "Operation Rewrite," *Problems of Communism*, 1953, No. 3-4.

[2] *Voprosy Istorii* [hereinafter cited as VI], 1955, no. 8, and 1956, no. 5. In early 1955 work ceased on a collective volume in the old "militant" vein, parts of which were to have been violently critical of American scholarship.

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cussion, and as if all that remained to be done was to repeat once again quotations which everybody knows only too well."[3] Indeed, one could increasingly sense camouflaged attempts to push beyond the old framework and raise questions that had been taboo for years.

All this was a carefully controlled prelude to the "new era," which in the field of history was ushered in several months before February 1956 when the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party staged a political "turn." In October 1955 a conference of historians, held to discuss a new volume of Russian historical writing, bared "serious doubts and disagreements" on a number of basic problems. The official spokesman summarized "the general defects in our historical science" frankly as:

> . . . an attempt to isolate Russian historical science from Western European, an immodest insistence on its superiority, a nihilist attitude toward pre-Marxian science, its reduction to a mere accumulation of factual knowledge, an effort to idealize past representatives of Russian social thought. . . .[4]

Four months later, when the party Congress was told that Soviet historical writing was the most backward of the social sciences, the new revisionism was given the highest stamp of approval.

The anti-Stalin campaign launched at that Congress gave the historians a new task. As usual, specific charges had to be reinforced by broader "theoretical" formulations—this time centering in the attack on the role of the individual in history. Under Stalin it had been imperative somehow to uphold the inevitability and omnipotence of historical laws, and at the same time to inflate the part of the Leader's genius. A by-product of Stalin's posthumous demotion was a shift of emphasis toward the "role of the masses" in history. Dozens of politically timely but substantively empty pamphlets and articles sought to provide a foundation for this new course. The loyal historians even discovered that Pushkin and Herzen had recognized the "role of the masses" as prime movers of history.[5]

These were the Soviet historian's habitual tributes to authority. More basic were the consequences of the invitation to review the entire Soviet past, as proffered by the ban on the official *Short Course of the History of the CPSU* and the so-called *Brief Biography* of Stalin. In closed session, Khrushchev lashed out against these works, while Mikoyan made the first public criticism of the *Course*—which until then had been considered sacrosanct as Stalin's own "unequaled model of a scientific, Bolshevik statement of history."

Initially, the leadership made known its views on only a few isolated events in party history. Yet there was a need, sensed by both politicians and historians, to do a more conscious job of rewriting. Who, after all, was still an enemy and who was not? When and how did Stalin become a villain? What had been suppressed and falsified in his days? The immediate impact of the new "line" was confusion and flux. It was necessary for the party to give guidance, and it was the historical journal, *Voprosy Istorii* [Problems of History], which was made the official medium for revisions and the vehicle for "rehabilitations"—the by-word of the new era.

Rehabilitations: Not All Is Forgiven

THE process of rehabilitating individuals previously purged or tacitly dropped from grace combines the present leadership's denigration of Stalin with a realization that it is politically profitable to correct such injustices—albeit posthumously. It began soon after Stalin's death with the unheralded reappearance of some surviving victims. Wholesale rehabilitations, however, came to public attention only after Mikoyan's speech of February 1956.

The butt of his attack was a book published in 1954, which attributed to two old Bolsheviks, Vladimir Antonov-Ovseyenko and Stanislav Kosior—both purged by Stalin—responsibility for anti-Bolshevik activity in the Ukraine during the Civil War. The volume had been officially acclaimed as a model of writing on Soviet problems and reviewed as a "great, valuable work." It was tragi-comically reminiscent of Stalinist practice, therefore, when in the wake of Mikoyan's strictures the historical journal "re-reviewed" the book. Now it was called "a model of how not to write history," and the author was exposed for willful distortions and suppressions of facts.[6]

The same review in passing gave favorable mention to two other prominent victims of Stalin—Mykola Skrypnik and Andrei Bubnov. This was typical of the oblique fashion in which Bolsheviks, dead or alive, were being restored to grace. Articles deplored the omission in various studies of such "vanished" party stalwarts as Chubar, Postyshev, and Rudzutak—men whom Khrushchev had in effect exonerated in

[3] VI, 1954, no. 10, p. 79. See also VI, 1954, no. 9, p. 5.

[4] VI, 1955, no. 12, pp. 188, 194.

[5] Sidorov, *op. cit.*, p. 213; *Ocherki istorii istoricheskoi nauki*, [Essays on the History of Historical Science], Vol. 1 (Moscow, 1955), p. 276, published by the Institute of History, Academy of Sciences.

[6] A. B. Likholat, *Razgrom natsionalisticheskoi kontrrevoliutsii na Ukraine* [The Defeat of the Nationalist Counterrevolution in the Ukraine] (Moscow, 1954); VI, 1954, no. 9, editorial; 1955, no. 4, pp. 145–52; 1956, no. 2, p. 202; and no. 3, pp. 138–45.

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his secret speech of February 25. Next came a group of Red Army commanders who had vanished during the Great Purges: historians were encouraged "to show the merits of outstanding commanders and political workers commissars of the Red Army" like Marshals Blücher, Gamarnik, and Egorov.[7]

For several months, both dictation and ambiguity were paramount in the field of Soviet history. The explicit restorations have remained highly selective: Trotskyites as well as Bukharinites are excluded; Radek and Tomsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev remain outside the pale. None of the victims of the public show trials of the 1930's have been rehabilitated under the current "unrewriting" of history. Equally important, no non-Bolsheviks have been exonerated: the entire process remains restricted within the party fold.

A number of issues in party history are still treated ambiguously and in confused fashion. The figure of Stalin himself, as it stands at present, is an aggregate of contradictory elements. While according to Khrushchev he was "bad" from 1934 on, other materials have shown him espousing an anti-Leninist position on revolution in the spring of 1917 and on nationality policy in 1922.[8]

Only gradually are such inconsistencies being resolved. Meanwhile pre-Bolshevik revolutionaries and non-Bolshevik Marxists such as G. V. Plekhanov are again placed in a somewhat more rational—though still "partisan"—light. Intraparty disputes of the 1917–27 era emerge in a slightly more factual version, and future students may at least be able to consult standard (but also thoroughly Bolshevik) histories of the party by Bubnov, Popov, and Yaroslavsky, which had been proscribed under Stalin. Indeed, they will be encouraged to go back to original sources and stenographic records of past Communist gatherings, which (for good political reasons) have become "bibliographical rarities." An important change is the admission that anti-Leninist Bolsheviks, both before and after 1917, were sincere opponents and not merely "cliques of exposed spies and wreckers" or "agents of hostile classes."[9] Their arguments—still emphatically rejected and denounced—may now be discussed on their merits and not in the official caricature of recent years. In substance, then, party history has returned to pre-1934 orthodoxy, rejecting many of Stalin's subsequent deeds but endorsing the Bolshevik "general line" against rightist and leftist opposition.

Pokrovsky Redivivus?

THE towering figure—and victim—of Soviet historiography was Mikhail N. Pokrovsky. Once the unchallenged Bolshevik master historian, he was in the 1930's subjected to a posthumous attack which highlighted the party's interference in the field of history. A series of decrees (over Stalin's, Korov's and Zhdanov's names) demanded, among other things, greater "appreciation of the national past" and greater stress on leading personalities in history. Pokrovsky had rejected these as "bourgeois" and "idealist" theses—a view intolerable under full-blown Stalinism, and the leading Soviet historians were rounded up to denounce him as a "hireling of fascism."

In spite of his extreme economic determinism and "sociological schematism," Pokrovsky's latently anti-Stalinist record made him a candidate for resurrection. The rewriting did not come easily. Only in the spring of 1955 did the switch become apparent: the new Soviet encyclopedia carried an article on Pokrovsky which, while not favorable, was at least factually correct.[10] Since then references to him have multiplied: he may again be discussed as an extremist who had erred but had done valuable work.

A somewhat more modest reappraisal has been accorded to Russian "bourgeois" historians. Though still violently scored on ideological ground, they may (as in the 1920's) be cited and discussed. Thus Soloviov, Kliuchevsky and Rostovtsev are again part

[7] VI, 1956, nos. 2 and 3. The revisions soon extended to the satellite states as well. In February 1956, Warsaw announced the rehabilitation of the Polish Communist prewar leadership, whom the Comintern had in 1938 branded as permeated with traitors and police agents. The "new line" also brought the exoneration of Laszlo Rajk in Hungary and Traicho Kostov in Bulgaria. After some awkward double talk, the Hungarian Communists in February 1956 also rehabilitated Bela Kun, leader of their 1919 revolt, who had been purged in Moscow in 1937.

[8] V. V. Pentkovskaia, "Lenin's role in the formation of the USSR," VI, 1956, no. 3; S. Yakubovskaia, *Kommunist* (Moscow), 1956, no. 10; *Pravda*, August 23, 1956. The official formula is that "while giving due attention to the merits of I. V. Stalin, showing his role as an organizer and theoretician, teachers must shed light on the most serious errors committed by him," and a series of articles in 1956 has sought to deflate Stalin's role in the period prior to 1917. On the other hand, and indicative of continuing confusion, is the fact that Volume XL of *Bolshaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia* 2d ed., which includes the article on Stalin, was skipped in May 1956 and is to be published only at some future date.

[9] VI, 1956, no. 2, p. 202; no. 3, p. 9. Memoirs of "old Bolsheviks" are being published in stupendous quantities—primarily for their political value as reminders of a Leninist lineage and a pre-Stalinist prototype, *faute de mieux*, of "collective leadership."

[10] Indicative of the coordination of such politically sensitive decisions, the first casual reference to Pokrovsky appeared during the same month as the volume of the encyclopedia (May 1955). (VI, 1954, nos. 7 and 8; 1955, no. 5, pp. 56–64; "Pokrovsky, M. N.," in *Bolshaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia*, 2d ed., XXXIII, 492.)

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of the national heritage. A veteran medievalist may again refer favorably to non-Communist Russian scholars like Maxim Kovalevsky, Sir Paul Vinogradoff, and Dmitri Petrushevsky.[11] As the head of the Soviet Academy's Institute of History declared:

While critically examining the heritage of prerevolutionary historiography, Soviet historians by no means jettison the findings of its concrete investigations, just as they do not discard the valuable factual results of investigations of contemporary foreign authors who adhere to a different methodology.[12]

It was convenient to reduce the gap between Soviet and Western historians to one of methodology. This enabled Soviet scholars to extend their toleration to some Western historians as well. A new volume on Russian historiography, published in 1955, soon came in for attack as excessively derogatory toward non-Soviet scholarship. Negative references to de Toqueville, Herder, Dahlmann, Lefebvre were called too crude or mechanistic: not all non-Soviet and pre-Marxian history, it now turns out, was *ipso facto* unscientific.[13]

The pendulum began to swing to the other extreme. Historians were castigated for "ignoring the influence of progressive Western European thought on the development of historiography in Russia." One could again discuss Hegel's or Montesquieu's influence on their Russian contemporaries, and travelers reported that "Western influences"—taboo for years—became favorite dissertation topics in Moscow and Leningrad.

From Ivan to Shamil: Turning Back the Clock

ALONG with Stalin, his favorite historical protagonists came in for denigration. The prime exhibit for this reversal is Ivan the Terrible. As late as 1955 Robert Wipper, the old historian who had raised Ivan to a peculiar respectability of political craft and statesmanship, was praised for his "correct evaluation of Ivan's personality." But a year later, just previous to Khrushchev's attack on the "Stalin myth," Ivan the Terrible was proclaimed to have been just another unworthy object of the "cult of the individual." Marshal Suvorov, much extolled as a military genius, came in for severe strictures for suppressing the "progressive" Pugachev uprising and fighting against the French Revolution.[14]

Even more basic was the termination of the ludicrous "Russia First" spirit, the insistence on Great Russian predominance and priorities in inventions. Lifting the ban on "foreign influences" was a relatively simple matter, and a systematic "debunking" of earlier falsifications (such as the claim of the invention of the airplane by Mozhaisky in 1882) proceeded apace.[15] The reassessment of the Tsarist past was a more critical matter. Now one could again attack the "idealizing" of Russia's role in the Crimean war and in nineteenth century Far Eastern politics.[16] Yet the key issue was that of Tsarist annexations.

Pokrovsky's downfall has ushered in the politically convenient theory that Russian conquest of neighboring nationalities had been culturally and economically a progressive development and hence a "lesser evil" than permitting them to stagnate or fall under British rule. One of the purposes of this thesis was to bolster the sense of "fraternity" between Russians and non-Russians within the empire. The same drive for multinational cohesion—now minus the overtones of Russian chauvinism—still obtains. Hence there is considerable reluctance to jettison the theory of the lesser evil in its entirety. Yet, as one historian commented publicly, for a while all national movements in Central Asia had been considered progressive; then "certain comrades" came to regard them all as reactionary. They could not be both. What was to be done?[17] The authorities apparently preferred to sidestep the issue. If after Stalin's death "the thesis about the progressive nature of the annexation of non-Russian peoples was no longer controversial," in 1956 it was still being maintained—a bit apologetically—that the conquests had their "progressive side."[18]

A natural candidate for rehabilitation was Shamil, the North Caucasian independence fighter of the mid-nineteenth century. Considered a popular hero in the early Soviet era, he fell prey to the efforts of the Zhdanovites to deny the positive nature of anti-Russian resistance movements. After World War II Shamil was subjected to a viciously hostile "review," which was forced upon an exceptionally reticent professional audience. Only in mid-1955 did Moscow publish a piece which in effect assailed his condem-

[11] E. Kosminski, *Osnovnye problemy zapadnoevropeiskovo feodalizma v sovetskoi istoricheskoi nauke* [The Basic Problems of West European Feudalism in Soviet Historical Science] (Moscow, 1955), p. 46.

[12] Sidorov, *op. cit.*, p. 210; *Ocherki*, I, 9, 14–15, 365, 434; VI, 1955, no. 8, p. 230, and 1956, no. 1, pp. 3–8.

[13] VI, 1956, no. 1, pp. 7–10. The earlier (1941) historiography by N. L. Rubinshtein has remained out of favor because of the author's "bourgeois-objectivist" heresies, for which he was condemned as a "cosmopolitan" but apparently forgiven in 1956. (See VI, 1956, no. 4, p. 20.)

[14] VI, 1955, no. 1, p. 192, and 1956, no. 2, pp. 205–6.

[15] VI, 1956, no. 6, pp. 124–8.

[16] VI, 1956, no. 2, p. 202. See also VI, 1956, no. 6, pp. 63–74.

[17] VI, 1954, no. 9, p. 177.

[18] VI, 1954, no. 7, pp. 106ff, 130ff; no. 8, p. 21; 1956, no. 2, p. 202; no. 3, p. 167.

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nation. While not daring to defend him, the author denied that Shamil had been a mere tool of the Turks or the British. Now the whole "distortion" is conveniently blamed on Mir Dzhafer Bagirov, former boss of Azerbaijan, who was executed in 1956 as an associate of Beria. The most recent version is that, while the annexations by Russia were "progressive," Shamil's opposition to them cannot be considered "reactionary." [19] Here is a piece of dialectical double talk typical of the transitional stage in post-Stalinist historiography. Clearly, further rewriting will ensue.

The Limits of Change

As important as the changes themselves are the prescribed limits of change. Soviet historiography continues to operate within a narrowly circumscribed totalitarian universe whose official boundaries have been set and within which the margin of debate may concern only matters of relative emphasis or detail. While in practice they may be violated, the line is officially insuperable, the foundations unshaken, and the premises unquestioned. While a given "line" may change, there is always some "line."

Despite the song-and-dance of political coexistence, there has been no lessening of "ideological militancy." Among the rehabilitated men, leading military figures like Tukhachevsky, Stern, Uborevich, and Putna have not been "reassessed." The publication of twentieth century documents remains narrowly limited to Bolshevik materials. On the Revolution of 1905 not even the leaflets of rival revolutionary parties may appear; as a spokesman of the Marx-Lenin Institute noted, "the publication of Menshevik documents is impermissible even if they reflect Bolshevik influence." [20]

The true story of collectivization, of intraparty "deviations," of Katyn, of assassinations and kidnap-

[19] VI, 1954, no. 9, pp. 114–7; 1955, no. 6, pp. 67–77; 1956, no. 2, pp. 75–84, 202–6; Arkhivnoe upravlenie GSSR, *Shamil* . . . [Tiflis, 1953], pp. iii, ix.

[20] VI, 1956, no. 2, pp. 205–8.

The Soviet Historian and the Tasks of the Times

Comrade Stalin . . . created new works, which brilliantly laid the groundwork for the achievement of a full socialist society . . . The works of Comrade Stalin mark a new stage in the development of Marxism, provide a magnificent model for a creative approach to social science, for a profound application of the teachings of dialectical and historical materialism to concrete historical facts and events.

The brilliant work of Comrade Stalin, "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR," . . . gives a brilliant definition of the basic economic laws of contemporary capitalism and socialism.

Under the wise leadership of V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin the party achieved the triumph of Leninist ideas . . . The great coryphaeus of science, the brilliant architect of communism, Comrade Stalin stressed in his scientific works the immense significance of the revolutionary upheaval of 1917. . .

The brilliant work of Comrade Stalin, "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR," raises to a higher level all aspects of the ideological and particularly scientific-theoretical work in our country, arms our cadres ideologically and hastens, in all countries, the victory of . . . Marxist-Leninist ideas.

—A. M. Pankratova, in Voprosy Istorii, *Moscow, No. 11, November 1952*

Comrades! The report of the Communist Party Central Committee made by Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev was heard with great attention and enthusiasm by the Congress and has met a fervent response among the working people of our country and the entire world. This report is an example of creative unity of Marxist-Leninist theory and the practice of Communist construction.

Comrade Khrushchev correctly pointed out the economic aspect of the theory of Marxism-Leninism and questions of concrete economics are now being brought to the fore.

The Central Committee's instructions regarding the need for combatting survivals of subjectivist-idealistic views on the role of the individual in history have played and continue to play a very important role in the development of the party's ideological-political training of our cadres.

Immense satisfaction greeted the injunction by Comrade N. S. Khrushchev . . . that truthful evaluations should be made without gilding and embellishment, that our entire ideological work should develop on a high theoretical level, in a resolute struggle against dogmatism and pedantry.

—A. M. Pankratova: Speech at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, Pravda, *February 22, 1956.*

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ings abroad, of the whole range of Soviet foreign policy provocations remains concealed, ignored, or denied. Indeed, the party has already chastized *Voprosy Istorii* for having published—under the pressure of "rotten" or at least "hasty" elements—during the months of relative flux, some articles which slurred over or ignored "the full significance of the party's struggle against Trotskyites, right opportunists, and deviationists," and others which "glossed over the differences of principle between Mensheviks and Bolsheviks."[21] Since July 1956 the authorities again have been seeking to impose a firmer and less "sensationalist" grip on history.[22]

It is indicative that the Central Committee's organ, *Kommunist*, saw fit to name even *Voprosy Istorii* as one of the current culprits, for the journal has excelled in subservience to the regime. It has had, in effect, the status of legislator in historical matters. Its chief editor, Anna Pankratova, is one of the few female members of the Central Committee. A prolific author, she has a remarkable record of shifting with the changing Kremlin winds. A fervent follower of Pokrovsky until his demise, she later wrote the lead article denouncing him. In 1939 she went so far as to insist that the Pokrovsky school was "the basis for the wrecking by the Trotskyite-Bukharinite hirelings of fascism, wreckers, and spies." She hailed Stalin on his seventieth birthday as the creator of Soviet historical "science" who had "extended the limits of Soviet history by 1,500 to 2,000 years." Now she professes to stand in the vanguard of the new revisionism, pontificating about a more "truthful," "scientific" anti-Stalinist approach.

The associate editor, E. N. Burdzhalov, who has written a variety of popular booklets and lectured at the party's Higher School, has endeared himself to the *apparat*. Since mid-1953 he has apparently been the guiding spirit of the journal—or rather, the transmission belt of impulses from the Central Committee. His tone at recent conferences has been self-assured, if not dictatorial, and it was over his signature that in May 1956 there appeared an article going beyond Khruschchev's attack in identifying Stalin with an anti-Leninist position in the spring of 1917.[23]

Flexibility and Ferment

WHATEVER the alterations, the regime's view that history is a weapon to be wielded by the political power has undergone no change. As before, historical anniversaries serve as the occasion for the fulfillment of state plans *in academe*. Historians have been called upon to celebrate the forthcoming fortieth anniversary of the 1917 Revolution with appropriate publications. As before, an individual can become an "un-person." In the latest chapters of "Operation Palimpsest" (to use Bertram Wolfe's term), the Great Soviet Encyclopedia suggested in 1954 that subscribers "carefully cut out" the pages referring to the purged police chief, Lavrenti Beria, substituting an item on the Bering Strait; again in 1956 the encyclopedia urged the excision ("using scissors or razor blade") of a page containing an article on Kao Kang, a Chinese Communist leader who, accused of conspiracy, allegedly committed suicide in 1954.

Political considerations dictate the diversion of emphasis—and funds—for the study of underdeveloped areas in the United States. Anti-Americanism in historical studies can be turned on and off at will. A more "truthful" study of Bolshevik history is requested in order to help "develop the contemporary tactics of foreign Communist and labor parties," to overcome "sectarianism" in them or promote "proletarian internationalism"—under Moscow's guidance.[24]

The past is but a means to an end. As a party historian remarked, he objected to a re-evaluation of Shamil not on the basis of fact but because "it would not further the strengthening of friendship among the nationalities" of the USSR.[25] Just as it recognizes no

[21] "For a creative reworking of the history of the KPSS," *Kommunist*, 1956, no. 10, p. 24. *Voprosy Istorii* complained editorially that "instead of characterizing Menshevism as a trend hostile to Marxism within the labor movement and showing its evolution, the tendency had been to depict it as a handmaiden of Tsarist autocracy."

[22] The end of the interlude of greater permissiveness was marked by the publication of the Central Committee's apology for past action and inaction (Resolution of June 30, 1956), the announcement of a new textbook on the Soviet period (hastily revised between February and July), the editorial in *Kommunist* of July 17, setting the limits of "creative research on the history of the CPSU," and the sharp attack on *Voprosy Istorii* in the Central Committee's other organ *Partiinaia Zhizn*, 1956, No. 14, pp. 62–72.

[23] Burdzhalov's previous, loyally Stalinist position is reflected in an article of 1948 in which he wrote: "The assertion that each country moves toward socialism in its own and completely original way, that there are as many routes to socialism as there are countries, cannot be accepted as correct. The general laws for the transition from capitalism to socialism . . . on the basis of the experience of the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet state, are mandatory for all countries." (*Bolshevik*, September 15, 1948, p. 51.) At present Burdzhalov may be classified as a "Mikoyan man." The attack on the historical journal in *Partiinaia Zhizn*, including specifically a criticism of Burdzhalov's writings as well as a partial defense of the Likholat volume, which Mikoyan publicly assailed at the Party Congress, suggests the possibility that the new "tightening" constituted a setback for the "Mikoyan line."

[24] *E. g.*, VI, 1955, no. 8, editorial; 1956, no. 3, p. 7. On the politically motivated increase in Soviet Oriental studies, see Walter Z. Laqueur, "The Shifting Line in Soviet Orientalogy," *Problems of Communism*, 1956, no. 2, pp. 20–6.

[25] VI, 1956, no. 2, p. 211.

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art for art's sake, so the Soviet state denies knowledge for the sake of knowledge or history for the sake of historical truth. This is reflected in the frank, continued concern for conformity on the "historical front" and in the official demand for new history texts which would serve "not only historical but also practical interests."[26]

Thus one may scarcely expect the regime itself to pioneer for dispassionate history. It is the historians who must speak out for higher professional standards, and—while many of the best men have died or vanished—some of them have done precisely that: so much so that they have already been rebuked for excessive zeal, political naivete or opportunism.

A recent critique of Soviet dissertations found one historian trenchantly condemning them as superficial, offering stereotypes in place of evidence, and idealizing the official favorites.[27] Of late, the demand for "facts instead of theories" has become a *leitmotif* of the craft.[28] S. Yakubovskaia, one of the leading women historians, began in 1954 to urge young scholars to be more careful in their assertions, to read more original documents, and in general to use historical data more conscientiously.[29]

How successful the new endeavors will be remains to be seen. Yet *Kommunist's* (No. 5, 1956) official endorsement of freer use of archival sources marks the victorious culmination of an effort begun in 1954 to make more materials—until then, largely in the custody of the MVD—available to scholarship.[30]

Recent reports from the Soviet Union speak of widespread intellectual ferment and questioning of axioms. Students have been jolted out of their ideologically secure existence; the old Stalinist routine of cynicism and cliches no longer satisfies. University youths, including apprentice historians, are reportedly groping, politically at sea, and often inclined to sympathize with what Soviet editorials have chastized as "rotten elements, taking advantage of the anti-Stalin campaign to slander the party's policy and its Leninist foundations." The situation was climaxed by the decision to suspend examinations in party history for the spring of 1956. Never before has there been such reluctant "ambiguity tolerance"—something the totalitarian organism inherently abhors and seeks to combat.

Yet there are distinct germs of hope in the present quest for more elbow room and more truth—demands which Soviet historians (like other professionals) voice with increasing vigor. One wing of the intelligentsia promptly took advantage of the new "thaw" to publicize sentiments suppressed for years. Their refrain was expressed by one who appealed to "distinguish between honest error and malicious fabrication, between mistaken views and outright untruths."[31] Underneath the display of conformity and subservient mimicry, alongside mediocrities and charlatans, there remains a finer self.

Soviet history, like state and society, is in a crucial process of transition. It remains a function of political development. Yet the iron logic of "de-control"—even within the Soviet framework—imposes a ticklish dilemma on the leadership. The political lords have permitted the intellectual to whet his appetite Henceforth, *l'appetit vient en mangeant*. Will they be willing to permit more questioning, further inquiry and research? And can they stop the present trend without attempting to revert to the rigidity of their predecessor?

In the long run, the present situation is untenable: it contains the seeds of its own destruction (to use the Bolshevik phrase), for it is beset by the inherent contradiction between political insistence on monolithic conformity and the emboldened demands of the professionals for academic and artistic freedom. It is palpably ludicrous to argue that, while Stalin erred, the party never did. Yet, what Khrushchev and Mikoyan have quarreled with are specific instances and forms of historical falsification—not the Bolshevik straightjacket of monistic determinism.

The new turn in Soviet historiography may well have unleashed dynamics unwelcome to its sires. Until they come to fruition, the Soviet historian must continue to navigate between cynical abandon to political dictation and courageous emancipation into scientific scholarship—scientific not in label but in method and spirit.

[26] The same concern with practical consequences has produced a symptomatic ambiguity within the Soviet leadership regarding history in general. While the effort documented above seeks to use history to prove the present rulers right, there is a countertrend toward "present-mindedness," and an inclination to let bygones be bygones (partly to exonerate themselves). This makes for a willingness—particularly in some bureaucratic and managerial quarters—to move away from the intense preoccupation with the past which characterized the Stalin era.

[27] VI, 1955, no. 3, p. 141.

[28] See *Doklady*, 1955, no. 7, pp. 79–98; The Institute of History, Academy of Science; and Yakobson, *loc. cit.*, p. 127.

[29] VI, 1954, no. 10, pp. 125–8.

[30] VI, 1954, no. 9, pp. 120–1; 1956, no. 2, p. 205; *The New York Times*, March 18, 1956. The "Main Administration of Archives," previously a part of the MVD, has been listed without the MVD identification since early 1956, though no change in ministerlai subordination has been announced.

[31] VI, 1956, no. 2, p. 194.

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Housing in the Workers' State

By TIMOTHY SOSNOVY

OVER eighty years ago Friedrich Engels declared that only "through the destruction of the capitalist mode of production can a solution to the problem of housing be found."[1] Soon after the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia, they acted on the basis of this precept to abolish private ownership of land, to nationalize most privately operated housing, and to establish monopoly control over housing construction. Thenceforth reliance was placed on compulsory regulation and on the operations of a planned economy to solve the problem of housing "in the interest of the masses."

Today, almost forty years later, Soviet housing remains one of the worst blights on the Communist record in the domestic economy. Throughout the past four decades the shortage and inadequacies of available housing have constituted—for the vast majority of the Soviet people—a continuing source of critical aggravation and hardship in their daily lives. Among the many factors contributing to this crisis, the obvious primary cause has been the Soviet regime's program of enforced industrialization: the development of heavy industry and the strengthening of the military potential of the USSR, which under Stalin became the basic unwritten law of the Soviet economic system, have led to the severe neglect of housing and other consumer needs of the population until recent date.

Belatedly the government has shown signs of genuine concern at the deplorable plight of Soviet housing and is making some attempt to alleviate the situation through a stepped-up program of construction and a campaign to promote more economy and efficiency in the building trade. As will be shown, however, it will take far more than the regime's present efforts to overcome a housing deficiency which has been forty years in the making.

[1] K. Marx and F. Engels, *Sochineniya* (Works), Vol. XV, Moscow, 1933, p. 46.

Mr. Sosnovy, a recognized authority on Soviet housing and urban economy, is author of *The Housing Problem in the Soviet Union* (Research Program on the USSR, New York, 1954) and of *The Development of Urban Centers in Soviet Russia*, soon to be published by the Harvard University Press.

Urban Housing—A "Fraction" of Space

THE USSR is the only country in the world in which the unit for calculating available housing is an absolute measure of living space in square meters per person.[2] In Western Europe and the United States, the accepted index of measurement is an apartment—that is, a self-contained unit of one or more rooms with its own facilities, recognized as providing the necessary minimum of comfort for an individual or a family; calculations of dwelling space per capita are based on this unit. The Soviet living-space index is the natural result of a housing situation in which it is the exception rather than the rule for a family to enjoy the use of private quarters, at least in urban areas. According to one Soviet definition:

The following types of living quarters may be distinguished, depending on the fraction which one receives: a whole apartment; a part of an apartment, consisting of two or more rooms; a part of a room (a corner); or space in a dormitory.[3]

Since quantitative considerations of dwelling space are primarily a problem of urban housing, it is with this sector of the Soviet housing economy that the present paper is mainly concerned.[4] Urban housing

[2] "Living space," by Soviet definition, means actual dwelling space, as distinguished from "non-living space" such as bathrooms, kitchens, and corridors. In analyses of Soviet housing, living space is generally considered to average 65 percent of "total floor area," non-living space as 35 percent. In Five-Year Plan statistics for overall housing construction the regime has now switched to calculations in terms of total floor space (see footnote 7); however, the living-space index is still used in calculations of per capita housing.

[3] *Slovar-spravochnik po sotsialno-ekonomicheskoi statistike* (Reference Dictionary of Social-economic Statistics), 2nd. Ed., Moscow, 1948, p. 352.

[4] By Soviet definition urban areas include: 1) cities of over 1000 population, not more than 25 percent of whom are engaged in agriculture; 2) workers' settlements of at least 400 population, 65 percent of whom are engaged in industrial activity; 3) health resorts, 50 percent of whose population is transient.

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capacity depends, of course, not only on the amount of construction going on but also on the rate of growth in the urban population; thus the vast acceleration in Soviet urban growth since the early 1930's has been a vital factor in the housing picture. The impetus to this growth was the dual program of enforced collectivization of agriculture and enforced industrialization initiated by Stalin; millions of peasants either fled from their farms to escape the former program or were pushed into the labor force demanded by the latter. As a result, urban population more than doubled between 1926 and 1939, rising from 26.3 million to 55.9 million.[5] Postwar migration and new territorial acquisitions further raised this figure to an estimated 87 million by April 1956.[6]

The prime factor in the Soviet housing equation has been the manifest failure of housing construction programs to keep up with this mushrooming urban growth. While there has been an absolute increase in construction from one Five-Year Plan to the next, the supply has fallen far behind urban needs. Even the meager goals set in the Plans went long unfulfilled, due to a discrepancy between the planned volume of building and the resources made available in both capital and labor. As a result, the first four Five-Year Plans fell substantially short of achievement; only in the Fifth Plan (1951–55) has the state succeeded in surpassing its planned objectives.[7]

The specific result of the imbalance between housing capacity and population needs emerges in calculations of per capita urban living space, as shown in the table below.[8] To appreciate the significance of these figures it should be noted that the generally recognized minimum standard of dwelling space per person allowing sufficient air for health is 9 square meters.[9] In prerevolutionary Russia, urban per capita living space fell short of this level but still registered 7 square meters, or 77.7 percent of the standard, according to calculations of the author based on data for 1912–14.[10] As the table shows, under Soviet communism this figure shrank almost steadily in the period up to World War II, with a consequent precipitous drop in the percent of the sanitary standard being met. In the postwar years the regime has succeeded in reversing the trend, but only back to a level somewhat less than that which prevailed in 1932—that is, a little over

[5] T. Sosnovy, *The Housing Problem in the Soviet Union*, Research Program on the USSR, New York, 1954, p. 102.

[6] Cited in *Narodnoye Khozyaistvo SSSR, Statisticheskii Spravochnik* (The National Economy of the USSR, Statistical Handbook), Moscow, 1956, p. 17.

[7] The goal and achievement of the Fifth Five-Year Plan were respectively 105 and 115.4 million square meters of total floor space (see footnote 2); *ibid.*, pp. 162–63.

[8] Overall housing capacity includes dwelling space in the private as well as the planned public sector of Soviet housing, a subject to be discussed further in the paper.

[9] This standard, established by the German health specialist Pettenkofer in the nineteenth century, is recognized by the Soviet Union as well as other countries; see A. N. Marzeev, *Kommunalnaya gigiyena* (Municipal Hygiene), Moscow, 1951, pp. 421–22.

[10] Sosnovy., *op. cit.*, p. 4.

URBAN LIVING SPACE: 1923–55*

Year	Urban population in millions at end of year	Total living space in cities in millions of square meters at end of year**	Square meters per person**	Percent of sanitary standard of 9 square meters per person**
1923	21.6	139.1	6.45	71.6
1926	26.3	153.8	5.85	65.0
1928	27.6	163.2	5.91	65.7
1932	38.7	191.3	4.94	54.9
1937	53.0	220.8	4.17	46.3
1940	50.2	242.1	4.09	45.4
1950	71.4	333.4	4.67	51.9
1955	87.0	416.0	4.78	53.1

*Figures through 1940 are calculated on the basis of various Soviet sources; see Sosnovy, *The Housing Problem in the Soviet Union*, Research Program on the USSR, New York, 1954, p. 106. Calculations for 1950 and 1955 are based on statistics in *Narodnoye Khozyaistvo SSSR, Statisticheskii Spravochnik* (The National Economy of the USSR, Statistical Handbook), Moscow, 1956. The figures for 1950 differ from those printed in the author's 1954 book due to new information in the later source cited.

**One square meter = 10.75 square feet.

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half the space considered minimally healthful.[11] The implications of the reversal for the future of Soviet housing will be analyzed in the final section of this paper. Meantime it is worth noting that the present living-space standard leaves the urban citizen substantially worse off than he was over forty years ago under the Tsars.

Some Comparisons

THE above data invite interesting comparisons with housing standards in other countries. In Italy, where overcrowded housing conditions are an admitted problem, census figures for 1951 show an average space per dwelling unit of 60 square meters, and 0.24 dwelling unit per capita in towns of over 20,000 population. This indicates only four persons to a dwelling unit, or 15 square meters per person—roughly three times the amount of total floor space available to the average Soviet citizen in 1950 and more than twice what he has now.[12] The United Kingdom census of 1951 shows an average 20 square meters per capita in urban areas.[13]

Soviet authorities have pointed out that their housing suffered considerable devastation in World War II, a factor contributing substantially to the postwar housing problem. Yet a comparison with Germany, the most heavily devastated country of all, indicates that the war is a poor excuse for the depressed state of Soviet housing. The German Federal Republic in 1954 had a population of some 49.8 million (10 million more than normal owing to the influx of refugees from Soviet rule), living in approximately 46.2 million rooms. Assuming the European average of 15 square meters to a dwelling room, the indication is that per capita space in Germany is almost double that in the USSR.[14] Using another basis of comparison, in contrast to the Soviet average of 3.42 persons to a room in 1950, the United States average was 0.83 person per room, or 0.67 person including the kitchen as living space.[15]

Private Housing: A Boost to the Record

ANY discussion of Soviet housing inevitably raises the question of regime policy toward private home-building and ownership, a factor which has had considerable influence on the curve of Soviet dwelling space standards.

The "public sector" of Soviet housing comprises at present about two-thirds of the housing fund (*i. e.*, the aggregate of available housing);[16] it is administered by the state through various agencies—mainly the economic ministries, individual industrial enterprises, and local soviets—all of which operate their own housing construction and maintenance programs within the limits of the central economic plan. The remainder of the housing fund constitutes the so-called "private sector" and consists in the main of housing constructed by individual builders for their own use. The private sector has been kept firmly under thumb through strict government regulation of a variety of housing matters and through state control and allocation of construction materials.

The state's attitude toward new construction in this sector has varied considerably through different periods of policy, with no little effect on the total housing situation. During the period of the New Economic Policy (1923–28) private building was openly encouraged through the extension of financial credit, materials and advice. With this spur to their initiative, private builders were responsible for almost two-thirds of the total dwelling space constructed in the NEP period.[17]

With the inauguration of the Five-Year Plan policies, however, a severe curtailment was imposed on individual housing. This was partly due to the economic stress on heavy industrial construction; it was also clearly a political move consistent with the regime's extension of control over every sphere of domestic activity. The Soviet citizens' resulting greater dependence on the state for living quarters (as well as for food, clothing, education, employment, and other needs) afforded a ready weapon for the enforcement of regime policies. Since the ministries, enterprises and local soviets administering housing had the power to grant or withhold living quarters, allocation of dwelling space came to be used as a means to

[11] As the chart shows, the author calculates per capita living space as 4.78 square meters for the end of 1955 (or 7.36 square meters of total floor space). In data supplied to a United Nations study (*The European Housing Situation*, Geneva, January 1956, pp. 38–9), the Soviet authorities claimed a per capita living space of 5.00 square meters by the end of 1954, based on a figure of 7.20 square meters of total floor space. It is obvious that an exaggerated coefficient was used in converting the latter to a living space figure.

[12] *IX Censimento generale della popolazione e rilevazione delle abitazione* (Ninth General Census of the Population and a Survey of Dwellings), Central Institute of Statistics, Rome, 1951.

[13] 1951 Census of Great Britain: Part I, General Register Office, London, 1952.

[14] *Statistisches Jahrbuch fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschlands* (Statistical Yearbook for the German Federal Republic), 1954, pp. 30 and 255.

[15] Sosnovy, *op. cit.*, p. 276; and *Housing Situation—1950*, Housing and Home Finance Agency, Washington, D. C., 1951, pp. 19, 25.

[16] *Narodnoye Khozyaistvo*, p. 163.

[17] *Vsesoyuznaya perepis naseleniya 17 dekabrya 1926 goda* (Union-wide Census of December 17, 1926), Short Summaries, Part I, Moscow, 1927, pp. 7 and 10.

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keep workers on the job and as an incentive to spur better work performance. In factory-run housing, security of tenure in an apartment was made dependent on continued employment; loss of a job meant automatic eviction.

There is no doubt, in view of the significant contribution made by private builders during NEP, that the housing situation of the 1930's and 1940's could have been considerably mitigated had the government continued to give active support to individual housing efforts. Realization of this fact, coupled with the continuing extreme crisis in housing after the war, probably motivated the regime's postwar reversion toward a policy more favorably disposed to private construction. Such construction, however, is more effectively supervised in the postwar period through the centralized provision of credits and through the stricter allocation of building materials. By these means the state has retained its power to grant or refuse building rights, dependent on the "cooperation" it receives.

Perhaps the most important development for private housing was the regime's decision in 1948 to grant Soviet citizens the right to buy or build, and to own as personal property, a one- or two-story house with one to five rooms.[18] Sections of land were promised by the government, at no extra charge, for the perpetual use of home-builders. Unlimited use of the land was made inseparable from the right of ownership of the building. Thus, the builder or buyer gained ownership of the house in perpetuity, with the right to bequeath it to an heir. In the whole era of Soviet communism, this is the first time the regime has come close to reinstituting private ownership of real estate.

That private builders are again making a substantial contribution toward the alleviation of the housing problem is shown by the following statistics: in the period from 1929 to 1955, of a total 279.3 million square meters of urban living space constructed, the state through its various agencies was responsible for 216.7 million square meters, or 77.6 percent, while individual builders constructed 62.6 million square meters, or 22.4 percent. Of the latter contribution, a good portion was accomplished from 1950–55, paralleling the period of the Fifth Five-Year Plan: private builders constructed 38.8 million square meters of total floor space (approximately 25.2 million square meters of which was living space), compared to the state sector's 115.4 million square meters of total floor space.[19]

Some Measures of Quality

SO FAR discussion has concerned the amount of construction and the per capita availability of dwelling space in the Soviet Union; living standards depend as much, however, on the quality as on the quantity of housing. Among the determinants of housing quality are the provision (or lack) of municipal or public utility services; the type of dwellings available for occupancy; the technical level of construction work; and the state of maintenance and repair.

Perhaps most important among these is the availability of utilities—that is, public water supplies, sewage systems, gas and electricity. In the Soviet

[18] Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet dated August 26, 1948, entitled, "Concerning the Right of a Citizen to Buy and Construct Individual Dwellings." See *Zhilishchnoye zakonadatelstvo* (Housing Legislation), Moscow, 1950, p. 494.

[19] *Narodnoye Khozyaistvo*, p. 162.

Public Utilities in Urban Areas: 1950*

Total number of cities and work settlements** in the USSR		PROPORTION WITH—								
		Public Water Supply			Sewage System			Gas Facilities		
Total	Cities Only	Number	% of Total	% of Cities Only	Number	% of Total	% of Cities Only	Number	% of Total	% of Cities Only
3,771	1,451	569	15.1	39.2	159	4.2	10.9	70	1.8	4.8

*Sources: *Planovoye Khozyaistvo* (Planned Economy), No. 4, 1955, p. 28; *Administrativnoye delenie souznykh respublik* (Administrative Division of Union Republics [as of January 1, 1951]), 7th. Ed., Moscow, 1951, p. V; A. N. Marzeev, *Kommunalnaya gigiyena* (Municipal Hygiene), Moscow, 1951, p. 11.

**For a definition of workers' settlements, see footnote 4.

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Union, the development of such utilities has been a severely neglected sector of the economy; the resulting dearth of fundamental municipal services in urban areas is shown in the table on page 34. Since the larger cities of the USSR are among those which have the services listed, the latter are available to a larger portion of the population than the percentage figures in the chart might imply. On the other hand, even in cities where municipal utilities are present, they usually provide service only to the central sections of the urban area: housing toward the outskirts is rarely connected to the central water, sewage, and gas systems. Electricity is generally available but in limited amounts; family units have no more than one or two electric lights of 25 or 50 watts each.

For the Soviet citizen these scarcities mean many inconveniences. Occupants of dwellings without running water must draw their supply from courtyard waterspouts, pumps, or street hydrants, frequently servicing several buildings. In more provincial areas, water must be lugged by bucket from wells or nearby rivers and ponds. Similarly, where plumbing is not installed, tenants must rely on outdoor toilet facilities with cesspools. Among other conveniences widely lacking are central heating and bath facilities.[20]

Choice Between Evils

A SECOND measure of housing quality is the type of dwelling available. In a pledge that has proven rash in retrospect the early Soviet regime decreed in 1920:

Each worker's family shall be given a separate apartment with a total floor space of at least 50 square meters; the apartment shall consist of two habitable rooms, a vestibule, a kitchen, a bathroom, and . . . a separate storeroom or cellar.[21]

The assortment of accommodations available to the average Soviet citizen offers a sorry contrast to this promise. The great majority of the urban population, as noted earlier, must suffer communal quarters of one sort or another. The most prevalent type of housing is the communal apartment, a unit of several rooms shared by a number of families, with usually one (but sometimes two or three) families to a room, and with kitchen and toilet facilities shared by all. Other common types of communal dwellings are barracks and multi-storied casernes, similar to huge rooming-houses.[22] During the Fourth Five-Year Plan emphasis was laid on constructing dwellings of the barracks and caserne type. Profound popular dissatisfaction with communal housing, however, has led to a more recent emphasis on small-unit housing. In the latter type of construction the regime's effort to achieve maximum dwelling space has given rise to mass production of box-type houses, with a minimum of modern conveniences and with little regard for architectural design.



—Hold it up; here comes the acceptance commission!
From *Krokodil*, Moscow, June 20, 1955.

In the private sector the great majority of housing consists of tiny dwellings with an average 36 square meters of total floor space, without running water, sewage disposal or gas.[23] Worst off of all are some poorer elements of the population whom the housing shortage has forced into such makeshift dwellings as shacks, sheds, earth huts, and even chicken houses.

It is not difficult to imagine the hardship imposed by such housing accommodations, particularly in the communal apartments and dwellings. Complaints and reports of individual cases in the Soviet press reveal the innumerable problems and aggravations which

[20] For further statistics and discussion on the utilities situation, see Sosnovy, *op. cit.*, pp. 135–47.

[21] Decree of the People's Commissariat of Labor, as quoted in A. N. Marzeev, *op. cit.*, pp. 413–14.

[22] Soviet postwar housing legislation forbids placing families in open bays not divided into separate rooms (see *Zhilishchenye zakony*, p. 168); because of the extreme need for housing, however, these decrees go unheeded.

[23] *Planovoe khoziaistvo* (Planned Economy), No. 4, 1954, p. 64. See also: *Finansy SSSR* (USSR Finances), No. 2, 1955, pp. 56–58; *Izvestiia* October 9, 1954.

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arise when people from all walks of life are thrown together in close proximity and are forced to use in common inadequate kitchen, bath and toilet facilities—when indeed these are present at all. The lack of storage space for food and belongings invites dirt, and dwellings are often infested with vermin. The din is constant. The frequent necessity for occupants of one room to pass through another to get to the facilities makes privacy or proper rest impossible. The air is permeated with the smell of kerosene and with fumes from primus stoves, used for cooking and heating water in rooms.

Such conditions have a telling effect on the nerves of the occupants, leading to constant bickering within and among families. The inevitable disputes which arise have led to a huge amount of housing litigation. Pettier cases, such as arguments over the division of charges among tenants for municipal utilities and for the maintenance of collectively-used facilities, are handled informally by so-called "comradely courts" attached to the house management of each building. More serious cases are handled by the People's Courts. The large number of such cases on the court dockets and the frequently improper operation of the courts lead to extensive delays in the settlement of disputes; literally thousands of people haunt the courts for years awaiting decisions in their cases.[24]

Construction and Maintenance Problems

SECOND only to complaints in the press at the lack of privacy and general overcrowding in housing are protests over the low standards of Soviet construction, our third measure of housing quality. In the race to create maximum new dwelling space within the limits of the economic plans, quality has been the consistent loser.

This problem has two root causes—first, the inefficiency and disorganization of the building trade, which is, through years of neglect, one of the most backward sectors of the Soviet economy; second, the continued shortage and poor quality of construction materials.

The building industry in the USSR suffers from a number of glaring defects, particularly in that sector devoted to housing. A proliferation of construction organizations, each subordinate to a particular department or ministry, has led to excessive red tape and a lack of coordination in construction work. Bottlenecks in the supply of essential materials frequently result in work stoppages. As a result, construction jobs often drag out over a number of years, new building is begun before previous construction has been completed, and the labor force is either overtaxed or not fully utilized. Equipment is scarce, tools often primitive. Finally, and perhaps most important, skilled labor is siphoned off for public and industrial buildings, leaving housebuilding to unskilled workers, many of them women.

Coupled with the continuing acute shortage and second-rate quality of construction materials, the result has been the shoddiest kind of workmanship in housing, particularly with respect to finishing and exteriors. As innumerable stories in the Soviet press attest, joints fit badly, mortar work is sloppy, stucco crumbles, doors and windows warp and hang, pipes rust, paint peels, inside tiling is uneven and easily comes loose. Hardwood floors are put in while construction is still underway; by the time the work is finished, they are gouged and pitted. Transport is inefficient, so that materials such as bricks arrive at building sites battered and bruised and soon fall to pieces. The typicality of these shortcomings is indicated by a 1955 survey of new housing in several RSFSR cities, recently reported in *Pravda:* of 1,700 new houses examined, only 15 were judged to be well-constructed.[25]

The inevitable result of such sub-standard construction is rapid deterioration; buildings five years old, it is said, often look 25 years old. Yet the provision for maintenance and repairs of housing is even worse than that for initial construction. The same sins of inefficient organization, excessive regulation, shortage of funds and materials, and lack of skilled labor have made the maintenance sector of the housing economy totally inadequate to handle necessary repairs. Again, the Soviet press is full of case complaints of repair jobs which left in their wake leaking roofs, smoking stoves, cracking plaster, crumbling ceilings, *et cetera*. A frequent report concerns failures to make routine repairs in time, leading to greater deterioration and consequently larger expenditures.

The Rent Myth

TO sum up thus far, the average Soviet citizen must endure in his housing not only the most extreme conditions of overcrowding and lack of privacy, but lack of fundamental facilities and conveniences as well; any attempt to improve his quarters through necessary repairs entails long months of waiting and likely as not an unsatisfactory job in the end. In recent years the Soviet regime has freely admitted and has allowed the press to criticize many

[24] *Deistvuyushcheye zhilishchonoye zakonodatelstvo* (Current Housing Legislation), Moscow, 1937, p. 476.

[25] *Pravda*, February 25, 1956.

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of these shortcomings in the housing sector; but against all failures it has pitted one claim of telling weight as an item of propaganda—the low cost of rent in the Soviet Union.

Soviet rentals are rigidly fixed on a base rate, with moderate adjustments determined by locality, quality and amount of dwelling space, and by the amount of the citizen's income. Average rent amounts to only four or five percent of the nominal income of a family (excluding utility charges), a fact which is tirelessly exploited in Soviet propaganda media.[26]

A close glance shows, however, that this rental figure is misleading. In the first place, existing rental rates fail to cover either the operating costs or amortization of Soviet housing; to the extent that funds must be allocated from other state income—much of which derives from artifically high prices on a variety of other goods and services—it is still the Soviet tenant who bears the ultimate cost. In other words, the Soviet tenant pays a hidden housing expense.

In the second place, rent must be judged on the basis of real rather than nominal wages. According to an authoritative study made in 1949, the Soviet Union had the lowest level of real wages of nineteen countries surveyed. The average hourly wage of a Soviet industrial worker in terms of his buying power (on the basis of food prices) was found to be 5.5 times less than that of an American worker.[27] On the basis of this figure it can be computed that in order to pay for one square meter of living space in an apartment, a Soviet worker had to work 27.4 minutes to an American worker's 27.3 minutes.[28] This comparison is made without taking into account the quality of the living quarters.

In short, though Soviet rental rates cannot be called excessive, the propagandists' claim to "the lowest level of rent in the world" is a gross fiction.[29]

The Rule of Privilege

THE housing conditions so far described obtain for the large majority of the Soviet population; for the upper strata of Soviet society, however, home is a happier place. The emergence of class and privilege in the Soviet social system since the early 1930's is clearly reflected in the preferential housing accorded

[26] D. L. Broner, A. I. Malginova, and P. G. Solovev, *Kvartirnaya plata v RSFSR* (Rent in the RSFSR), Moscow, 1954, p. 3.

[27] "Work Time Required to Buy Food," *Monthly Labor Review* (Washington, D. C.), November 1949, pp. 487–93.

[28] Sosnovy, *op. cit.*, p. 180.

[29] As claimed in *Kalendar-spravochnik* (Calendar Handbook), Moscow, 1952, p. 410.

Upper Box:—It's time to repair the balcony!
—Eh? I can't hear.
Lower Box:—I say it's time to repair the balcony!

From *Krokodil*, Moscow, October 20, 1955.

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to Soviet party and government bureaucrats and to the technical and professional intelligentsia, the degree of such privilege depending on relative rank and importance in the hierarchy.

The top layer of ruling cadres in the party and government and leaders in the economic, military, professional and cultural spheres enjoy the best housing available, living either in individual homes or in spacious apartments in specially constructed residential buildings. Apartments of this type first made their appearance in Moscow during the 1930's; they boast four or five rooms with all modern conveniences and servants' quarters; each building has in addition dining rooms, laundries, nurseries, and flat roofs to accommodate a physical culture area and restaurant.[30]

The middle and lower strata of the bureaucracy similarly enjoy private apartments in special buildings or, in some cases, private homes, but on a less sumptuous scale. The lower strata have the right to additional living space in the form of a separate room, paying for it at a single-unit rent. By law such accommodation is granted to the following: army personnel from the rank of colonel on up; honored scientists, artists, and technicians; outstanding actors; members of the Union of Soviet Writers; sculptors; composers; architects; inventors; lawyers; doctors (for examining rooms); and certain classes of invalids.[31]

Because of the housing shortage, many of the lower strata professionals and bureaucrats apparently have been unable to get the space they are entitled to by law. Data based on 1940 conditions (the latest available) indicate a per capita living space among the professional intelligentsia of 7.6 square meters, a figure probably somewhat improved by now.[32] While compared to European and American standards, this amount of space seems deplorably small, it nevertheless constitutes a substantial improvement over the situation of the average "lower class" citizen, as shown in the first table.

It should be pointed out that the aforementioned 1948 decree granting the right of private home-ownership in perpetuity was aimed primarily at sanctioning the privileged position of the Soviet "elite." While the right of ownership was also granted to small home-builders, the wording of the decree—especially its provision approving the construction of five-room houses—clearly indicated that its purpose was to please the richer elements of the population who could afford such housing.

[30] *Moskva* (Moscow), 1935, p. 604.

[31] *Zhilischchnye zakony* (Housing Laws), Moscow, 1947, p. 120–21.

[32] Sosnovy, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

Prospects for the Future

THERE remains the task of summing up the present situation in Soviet housing and assessing probable future trends in the light of post-Stalin policy.

Nothing can hide the fact that the Soviet government, controlling as it does every aspect of the nation's life, has crowded some 87 million people into its towns and cities in the pursuit of industrial expansion, and has at the same time failed to provide anywhere near adequate accommodation for them. It has refused to channel a large enough portion of the national resources into developing a building industry, and it has directed that industry primarily into capital construction. The situation which has resulted is such that even the comparatively low rent paid by most Soviet workers for their accommodation is poor recompense for the abysmal living conditions of all but the privileged classes.

Nevertheless a change in the tide is discernible: the Soviet regime has demonstrated increasing concern in the postwar era, particularly in the post-Stalin era, over the critical state of Soviet housing. Not only have greater (if still inadequate) allocations been apportioned to housing construction, but the regime has conducted a stepped-up verbal campaign to spur greater economy and efficiency in the building trade and to encourage the development of better mass production techniques, particularly in the field of prefabricated housing.[33]

The Sixth Five-Year Plan for 1956–60, announced last January, calls for the construction of 205 million square meters of new total floor space, a seeming increase of 100 million square meters over the Fifth Five-Year Plan.[34] However, this figure includes for the first time the total floor space to be constructed in rural villages; in this author's opinion the urban share of planned new housing will attain but will not exceed the Fifth Five-Year Plan level.

For the future it may be assumed that the existing rate of housing construction in both the public and the private sectors will be sustained, barring unforeseen circumstances markedly affecting Soviet domestic or foreign policy. Moreover, there are indications that migrations of the village population to the cities will drop off substantially. On the basis of these assumptions, the author calculates that it will take the Soviet Union 25 years (*i. e.*, until the end of the

[33] N. S. Khrushchev, *Concerning the Broad Instillation of Industrial Methods, Improved Quality and Reduction of Construction Work* (in Russian), Moscow, 1955, pp. 16–30.

[34] *Pravda*, January 15, 1956. See also footnote 7.

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Tenth Five-Year Plan in 1980) to achieve a living-space standard of 7.38 square meters per person—a figure which would still represent only 82 percent of the minimum health standard.[35]

Any substantial change in Soviet domestic or foreign policy would, of course, adversely affect this estimate. It is obvious that the Soviet regime will continue to give priority to the development of its heavy industrial and war potential. The amount of capital investment in housing construction will be determined by the degree of this emphasis in any given period and by other considerations of overall policy. In particular, a more aggressive program of foreign economic investment—especially in Asia and the Middle East where the Soviet Union is attempting to woo the so-called uncommitted nations—might slow down the rate of improvement in the housing economy.

In sum, the Soviet regime has only begun to undo the sins of a 40-year neglect of Soviet housing; under optimal conditions of continuing improvement in the housing sector, it will be many years before the average Soviet citizen can look forward to anything like decent accommodations in the "workers' state".

[35] The factors involved in this calculation are too complex to explain in a paper of this scope. The reader is referred to the author's forthcoming publication, *The Development of Urban Centers in Soviet Russia*, for a detailed explanation of the calculation and an analysis of new population trends.

Communism's Fourth "Lever":

The Youth and Student Fronts

By JOHN CLEWS

THE coming months will see the unfolding of a worldwide Communist-inspired propaganda campaign urging young people to "come to Moscow" for the "Sixth World Festival of Youth and Students for Peace and Friendship," scheduled to take place from July 28 to August 11, 1957. In addition to tens, possibly even hundreds, of thousands of Soviet participants, the organizers count upon drawing as many as 30,000 delegates from outside Soviet boundaries to join in a program subtly designed to impress upon them the "richer life" under communism.

Mr. Clews, a British writer on international affairs, is particularly interested in the activities of Communist front organizations. He has first-hand knowledge of the functioning, purposes, and leading figures of the World Federation of Democratic Youth and International Union of Students.

Five previous gatherings of this nature have been held under Communist auspices: at Prague in 1947, Budapest in 1949, East Berlin in 1951, Bucharest in 1953, and Warsaw in 1955. Sooner or later, when the Soviet planners considered the time ripe, Moscow's turn was bound to come, and 1957 has been fixed as the appointed year. Two major reasons, one organizational and the other ideological, influenced this decision: organizationally, the Russians are only now equipped to cope with relatively large numbers of visitors; ideologically, 1957 marks the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution and, as such, is to be highlighted by worldwide party celebrations.

The groundwork for the 1957 youth gathering is already well under way. In the USSR itself, preparatory work began in earnest last spring. At the

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beginning of August, the International Festival Preparatory Committee met in Moscow, attended by over 100 representatives from 52 countries including all members of the Sino-Soviet bloc, as well as Britain, Italy, Greece, Ceylon, Ecuador, and Mexico. According to Tass News Agency, the meeting heard "enthusiastic" reports on the progress of preparatory work in the various countries.[1]

On August 18 the committee addressed an appeal to the youth of all countries laying particular stress on the non-political objectives of the 1957 festival. "Greater mutual understanding, confidence and friendship," stated the preamble, "are gradually being established. . . . In these circumstances the aspirations of youth for cooperation, friendship and peace are growing." The appeal continued:

The festival is open to all youth, irrespective of its convictions, race, religious beliefs or nationality. No political, ideological or other tendencies will prevail at the festival. It will be held in the spirit of mutual respect and understanding, in the spirit of the friendship of the youth of all countries. Its program . . . reflects the hopes and interests of various groups and strata of youth.[2]

Old Pill, New Flavor

DESPITE this disclaimer of "political tendencies," they will most certainly be present even if somewhat more disguised than hitherto. As outlined by the Preparatory Committee, the 1957 festival program follows the pattern of the past in providing for various kinds of "seminars" and discussion groups, as well as for exhibitions, stage and dance performances, sports and excursions. The former will constitute the political pill, and the latter will provide the sugar coating. The technique will thus be unchanged; only the sugar coating is likely to be a bit thicker.

Although the Preparatory Committee ostensibly held its Moscow meeting to decide the festival program, its "decisions" had curiously been anticipated three months earlier by A. Rapokhin, a secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Young Communist League (Komsomol), writing in the monthly Komsomol organ *Molodoi Kommunist* (No. 6, 1956). Rapokhin not only outlined the program virtually as it was later adopted by the international committee, but also spoke of the purposes of the world youth assemblies in terms which belied the professions of non-political intent contained in the committee's August 18 appeal. These festivals, he declared,

. . . are a big contribution by young people to the universal fight for peace, national independence, and a better future. They are an effective means of uniting young people of different political trends and convictions, and of establishing collaboration between national and international youth organizations. . . . The preparations for the [Moscow] festival are proceeding under conditions of a new and mighty upsurge of the movement of the peoples for the prevention of a new war and for the peaceful settlement of all international problems.

By this reiteration of the old-style "peace" language of the Cominform, Rapokhin put the nebulous assurances of the later committee appeal into more correct perspective and disclosed the real function of the festivals, which is to promote the current political strategy of Moscow. The 1957 gathering, he emphasized, "will take place in the capital of the first socialist state in the world, and therefore the interest of foreign youth in the new festival is combined with a tremendous desire to see the Soviet Union with their own eyes, to get to know our young people, their affairs and their thoughts."

Of particular interest in Rapokhin's catalogue of special events planned for the 1957 festival was a meeting of rural youth to be held on the site of a concurrently scheduled All-Union Agricultural Exhibition in Moscow, the purpose of which will be to extol the achievements of collectivization. This and similar measures, he added, "will help the envoys of youth from various countries to find a common language in the solution of such problems . . . as the fight for peace, for the rights of youth, and for a better future."

The organizations activating this search for the "common language" are the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) and International Union of Students (IUS), which have operated as Communist fronts in their own special sectors for the past decade. Despite this long activity, there is still much confusion about the identity and functions of the two bodies, the *New York Times*, for example, referring to the September 1956 IUS Congress at Prague as a "Youth Congress."[3]

[1] British delegate Stanley Levenson, according to Tass, reported that "the youth of Britain are energetically preparing for the festival." Levenson, after three years in the IUS secretariat at Prague, has been, since 1952, organizing secretary of the British Youth Festival Committee, which arranges British participation in WFDY festivals. He was a consultative delegate to the 1954 congress of the British Communist Party.

[2] Tass News Agency report, August 18, 1956.

[3] *New York Times*, September 2, 1956.

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Early Development

INDEED, the fact that separate youth and student organizations exist is interesting in itself. When the WFDY was formed in November 1945, the Soviet representatives opposed a separate student organization and advocated instead the inclusion of a student section within the WFDY, so as to make it an international replica of their own Komsomol. Various West European groups, however, insisted upon an independent student organization, and in 1946 the Soviet objections were withdrawn in return for certain concessions to their own point of view. The inaugural IUS Congress was staged at Prague in August 1946, its proceedings clearly reflecting Communist domination.[4]

In 1945 the claimed membership of the WFDY was 30 million, rising by ten years later to over 80 million in nearly 100 countries. The IUS, of course, is much smaller: it claimed a 1955 membership of vaguely more than 5 million students in 72 countries, compared to 1.5 million in 38 countries in 1946. Significantly 1956 has seen a contraction of the claimed IUS figures by 2 million students and 36 countries compared to 1955.

Diffidence about membership details makes it difficult to ascertain the breakdown of these figures, but the bulk of the members are obviously in the countries of the Sino-Soviet orbit, particularly the USSR and China which both have youth and student unions running into millions. Most of the non-Communist organizations which supported the WFDY and IUS at the beginning had defected by 1949, and the rest have since followed suit. Today no major non-Communist youth organization supports the WFDY, while the IUS can claim only 20 national student unions in its ranks, with a dozen of these from Communist countries.

The originally avowed aims of both organizations, as stated in their constitutions, sounded highly commendable: the promotion of international understanding and cooperation, the furtherance of all the freedoms and the rights of young people to good conditions of employment and reasonable standards of living. But disillusionment came with the realization that, in practice, these fine purposes were translated into attacks on Western policies and efforts to impose the Soviet viewpoint. On the other hand, there was a "conspiracy of silence" regarding attacks by Communist authorities on the rights of youth and students. The WFDY, for example, ignored the post-1948 suppression of the Scout and Guide movement in Communist Czechoslovakia; similarly, the IUS passed off the mass expulsions of students from Czechoslovak universities in 1948–49 as a mere "weeding-out" process without political motivation.

[4] An observer group from the British Union of Catholic Students attended the 1946 congress and drew up a report after its return testifying to the strongly pro-Communist political flavor of the proceedings. The report, which was "withdrawn" at the request of the then Communist-dominated British National Union of Students, stated: "The keynote was always the same—fight fascism in all its forms, which include reaction and imperialism. Attempts by both the Swiss and Dutch to turn the congress onto quieter paths of constructive work fell on deaf ears."

Expulsion of Yugoslavs

WHAT attraction the two organizations still held for idealists as expressions of world youth and student unity was finally shattered following the Cominform break with Tito. In 1950, both the WFDY and IUS toed the Moscow political line by expelling their Yugoslav member organizations, as did all the other international Communist fronts. The process by which the IUS carried out its expulsion action at an Executive Committee meeting in London in February 1950 is particularly revealing and is documented by a verbatim record, kept by non-Communist delegates, of the Executive's interrogation of the Yugoslav student union representative, Jaksa Bucevic.

The expulsion issue did not, in fact, appear on the agenda of the meeting and was taken up under the heading of "other business." When Bucevic asked for a hearing, the committee at first refused but was induced to change its collective mind by a threatened walk-out of the British delegate. IUS President Joza Grohman then read the "charges" against the Yugoslavs before Bucevic was admitted to the hearing. Part of the ensuing interrogation went as follows:

GROHMAN: Is it true that there are 4,000 students in gaol in Yugoslavia?
BUCEVIC: This is a fiction. We think you should take as the basis for discussion our memorandum on relations between the People's Youth of Yugoslavia and the IUS.
GIOVANNI BERLINGUER (IUS Secretary General): This is going too far. We have already gone a long way to meet the case of the Yugoslavs. We have interpreted the constitution to say that the Executive is one of the governing bodies of the IUS; the Yugoslavs have by their action broken the constitution; and yet we have allowed them to answer questions when the constitution merely says that they should be present at the discussions. Now the Yugoslav observer is trying to lay down the law about how the Executive should proceed. I repeat the question: Is it true that there are thousands of students in gaol in Yugoslavia?
BUCEVIC: This is a fiction.
GROHMAN: So I understand that you refuse to reply.

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STANLEY JENKINS (British member):Bucevic has replied and has said that the statement is a fiction.
LUIS ASCARATE (IUS Treasurer): On a point of order, we understand that the Yugoslav is being questioned, and it is very difficult if Jenkins interrupts the questions and answers.[5]

The rest of the "hearing" proceeded in the same highhanded manner, with the final expulsion decision a foregone conclusion. Moreover, when the British delegation sought to reopen the issue at the IUS World Student Congress at Prague in August 1950, the sole result of its effort was to spur the Communist press into violent attacks on the delegation and particularly its leader, Stanley Jenkins.

Mlada Fronta, organ of the Union of Czechoslovak Youth, sounded the keynote of the offensive on August 16 by accusing Jenkins of attempting "to smuggle into the congress a defense of Tito-fascist bestialities." The Soviet press chimed in with an *Izvestia* (August 17) denunciation of Jenkins as "an agent of international reaction" who "presumed to justify the crimes of the imperialists in the colonies and to defend American aggression in Korea"; and a somewhat more restrained declaration by Alexander Shelyepin, then IUS vice-president, in *Komsomolskaia Pravda*, hailing the congress' "indignant rejection" of suggestions by the British and Danish student union leaders in favor of "collaboration with the fascist Yugoslav leadership."

In such a context, it is not surprising that the 1950 congress later figured in a broader international issue. According to the officially published version of the May 1951 trial proceedings against American news correspondent William Oatis in Prague, the defendant's own testimony showed him guilty of "spying on the progressive delegates" to the congress, which he had covered as accredited Associated Press correspondent.[6]

Although many further evidences might be cited to illustrate the Communist-dictated political orientation of the IUS in its early days, the foregoing suffices to show its real character and objectives. The WFDY is the "big brother" of the IUS, and if its functions are less known, it is only because the non-Communist participants quit it at an earlier date than they left the Communist student front.

Role in "Peace" Movement

THE WFDY has always been closely associated with the Communist-sponsored "Partisans of Peace" movement and World Peace Council.[7] The importance ascribed to its role in this phase of international Communist activity was candidly acknowledged by the official organ of the Cominform in June 1950 in these terms:

The WFDY and the organizations affiliated to it more and more persistently place the struggle for peace in the forefront of their activities, pointing out to youth that, in view of the criminal manifestations of the warmongers, the struggle for democracy, the national independence of peoples, and a better life is bound up with the struggle for peace.[8]

Still more recently, in October 1955, the "peace" role of both the WFDY and IUS was re-underlined in a Soviet pamphlet published under the title, *Youth—The Active Strength of the Movement of the Peoples for Peace and Friendship*. The contents and tone of this document clearly reflect the dual aspect of the two organizations. On the one hand, for the benefit of non-Communists, they are presented as "progressive" instruments of international collaboration. On the other, they are considered, in party circles, primarily as means of mobilizing active sympathy and support for Communist policies and "neutralizing" opposition to these policies wherever possible.

As the darker of these two countenances became apparent, the non-Communist groups which found bona-fide international work impossible within the WFDY and IUS seceded in the period 1948–50 to form two new organizations, the World Assembly of Youth (WAY) and the International Student Conference (ISC). From the time of their inception, these new bodies were bitterly attacked by the Communists and fellow-travelers as "splitters of unity," but between them they now embrace a majority of the national youth and student organizations outside the Communist world.

Although, as the October 1955 Soviet pamphlet just cited shows, the basic purpose of the WFDY and IUS as instruments of international Communist policy remains unaltered, the decline of their influence has led both organizations to modify their tactics in the last three years. This change may be said to date roughly from Stalin's death, but in the case of

[5] Extract from Document NUS/49-50/79, National Union of Students of England, Wales and Northern Ireland. The author also was an eye-witness to the Bucevic interrogation.

[6] Oatis had, in fact, been "expelled" by the congress at its final session on the ground that he had been victimizing the "progressive" American delegation. The chief basis for this charge was that Oatis had sent a news dispatch reporting an incident in which John Marquesse, one of the American delegates, publicly embraced a lieutenant-colonel who was a member of the Communist North Korean delegation. All this was revived in the 1951 trial.

[7] How the activities of all these organizations are coordinated is described in F. Bowen Evans, *Worldwide Communist Propaganda Activities*, Macmillan, New York, 1955.

[8] *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy!*, Bucharest, June 9, 1950.

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the IUS the first signs of a modification had already appeared at the beginning of 1953 in connection with the question of liberalizing membership rules.

In 1951 the British had proposed a modification of these rules in the form of a provision for a new "partial membership" classification in the IUS, with partial members to be allowed to participate in "practical activities" while eschewing political decisions. At the time, however, the British proposal was rejected, for reasons which in fact were quite sound. The IUS position essentially was that membership in an organization necessarily entailed the obligation to abide by its decisions or it would become largely meaningless.

Early in 1953 this previous uncompromising stand was suddenly reversed in a direction criticized by party purists in the IUS as "opportunism." An amendment to the membership rules was drafted to set up a category of "associate membership" conforming essentially to the earlier British proposal, and the amendment was ratified by the 1953 IUS Congress at Warsaw. The liberalization now appears to have been carried one step further. The latest IUS World Student Congress, which met at Prague in September, agreed to make future decisions "permissive" instead of compulsory, obviously hoping thereby to attract "fringe" organizations, either as newcomers to the fold or as stray lambs returning to it.

The WFDY likewise appears to be moving toward less strict centralized control. At a recent meeting in Prague, the WFDY Council reportedly considered amending its own constitution to allow "more independence for national organizations" and favored a greater emphasis on regional conferences under WFDY auspices. The explanation of these steps clearly lies in Communist realization that the WFDY and IUS cut little ice with national youth and student organizations outside the Communist orbit. They need this national recognition and are prepared to loosen their organizational reins for the sake of winning it, though the reins will still be kept in their own grip.

Failure of "United Front" Tactics

WITHIN their own spheres the WFDY and IUS are also following the current general Communist line of the "united front," as are the World Federation of Trade Unions and World Peace Council. For well over a year the WFDY has been assiduously wooing the non-Communist WAY, while the IUS has made parallel overtures toward the ISC. The WFDY Executive got as far as a meeting with its rival counterpart in May 1956 to talk things over, but all suggestions of a rapprochement were rebuffed by the WAY Council at its meeting in Berlin in August.

The IUS has had no better luck with its new line of "cooperation" with the ISC in place of "unity" (within its own ranks). The ISC reply has been that effective world student cooperation is already taking place within its organization, which embraces three-quarters of the national student unions in existence; and that it is for the minority outside the ISC to join its ranks, not vice-versa. Indeed, the IUS faces the sad realization that it has acted too late. Those who pressed for a "de-politicization" of the organization in 1950, in the fight over Yugoslav expulsion, were then denounced as "splitters attempting to close entry into the IUS by democratic student organizations." [9] Now, at last, the lead of the "splitters" is being followed, but lost ground is not likely to be regained. Whereas the 1950 Student Congress was attended by over 1,000 delegates and observers, barely 600 attended in 1956. In contrast, the 21 national unions represented at the first International Student Conference in 1950 swelled to nearly 60 at the 1956 conference.[10]

It should be noted that both the WFDY and IUS, just as they obediently toed the Moscow line in the 1950 break with Yugoslavia, have been equally quick to eat the harsh words of the expulsion resolutions in line with the new policies of the Kremlin. But, in spite of the formal annulment of these resolutions, the Yugoslav youth and student organizations have thus far shown no intention of returning to the fold. Here, too, the new tactics have failed.

Nevertheless, with their looser organizations and "united front" approach, the WFDY and IUS are still hopeful of attracting more non-Communists to their ranks. They have been active in the uncommitted areas of Asia and Africa, and in Latin America, to a degree not possible only a year or two ago, when they were denied entry to such places as India, the Sudan, and the Middle Eastern countries. Previously banned from Egypt, they can now count upon operating there with impunity, if not with official blessing. The step-up in Latin America was attested to, even though

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[9] Shelyepin in *Komsomolskaia Pravda*, previously cited in text.

[10] Most of the IUS membership outside the Communist orbit in recent years has been composed of small and unrepresentative "progressive" (fellow-traveler) groups rather than the national unions, the bulk of which are in the ISC. In order to attract the latter, the 1956 IUS Congress further amended the IUS constitution to limit membership to national unions and disqualify minority groups, but this step also has backfired. The Austrian minority group in the IUS, for example, withdrew and invited the national union (Hochschülershaft) to take its place, but the latter refused.

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unfavorably, by Brazil's expulsion of an IUS group in June 1956, on grounds of subversive activities.

It must be recognized, moreover, that the WFDY and IUS, despite the weaknesses which flow from their tie with Moscow, also derive from it an advantage which is denied to rival democratic organizations. They are backed by the whole Communist machine, with all its powers to exhort and compel, and with its command of vast financial resources. The Moscow Festival next summer will be a striking illustration of what this advantage means.

Festival Preview

FIRST of all, the festival plans envisage the transportation of 30,000 participants from all over the world. Most of them, it is true, will come from the neighboring Communist countries and from Communist China, but there will still be several thousand invited from non-orbit countries and who will travel for the most part by special planes, ships and trains. For British participants, the cost for the entire trip—including travel both ways and a fortnight's stay in Moscow—will reportedly be about $150; but since the actual cost will be closer to $400 per person, a considerable degree of Soviet official subsidization is involved. Many of the "colonial" delegates, indeed, will go entirely free, their expenses to be paid out of various "solidarity funds" raised in the USSR and East European satellites to ensure the "right kind" of representation from the "colonial" areas.

Once in Moscow, the foreign delegates will have 2,300 omnibuses put at their disposal in addition to free travel on the regular city transport facilities (which incidentally are inadequate to satisfy the needs of the Moscow population itself). Schools will be turned into hostels, and mass feeding arrangements will be provided. In view of all this, Rapokhin's remark, in his earlier quoted article in *Molodoi Kommunist*, that "the holding of the festival will mean a certain expenditure of money" sounds like a gross understatement.

Lavishness will also characterize the various displays and performances to be staged by groups from the Communist countries to "demonstrate the achievements of socialist art and sport." Needless to say, the performers will be the best that the Communist world has to offer. In the Soviet Komsomol, for example, competitions have already been started in the union republics to select the finalists who will go to the All-Union Festival of Soviet Youth, scheduled to take place around May Day, 1957, and who also will represent the Soviet Union in the subsequent World Festival.

By contrast, the presentations from the non-Communist world, in the absence of such unstinting official support and careful preparation, are likely to appear drab and amateurish. The contrast, of course, is part of the deliberate intent of the organizers, for in this way they hope to impress upon the thousands at the festival—and through them many more thousands of youth in non-Communist countries—the "poverty" of capitalism and the "richness" of life under communism.

* * *

It is to be expected that the new, more subtle tactics adopted by the WFDY and IUS will be carefully followed at the Sixth World Festival. But behind the tactical facade, there is as yet no evidence that either organization has ceased to regard its central task as but a projection, on the international level, of the mission assigned by Lenin to the Soviet Komsomol at its Congress in 1920:

The whole object of training and educating the youth of today should be to imbue them with Communist ethics. . . . Our morality is entirely subordinated to the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat. . . . The basis of Communist morality is the struggle for the consolidation of communism.[11]

It is a long way from Lenin and the Komsomol Congress of 1920 to the Moscow World Youth Festival in 1957. In the interim—more specifically, between the two world wars—the Soviet Communists sought to further their international objectives through the creation of a Young Communist International (KIM), which however was never successful. Today, the WFDY and IUS are counted upon to achieve, by more subtle and devious means, what the KIM was unable to achieve directly.

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[11] V. I. Lenin, "Tasks of the Youth League," *Collected Works*, (Russian Edition), Moscow, Vol. 31, pp. 266–70, *passim*.

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Three Studies on China

Theodore Shabad:
China's Changing Map,
Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1956, 295 pp.

Henry Wei:
China and Soviet Russia,
D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1956, 379 pp.

F. F. Liu:
A Military History of Modern China: 1924–1949,
Princeton University Press, 1956, 312 pp.

Reviewed by Allen S. Whiting

THESE three books are welcome additions to the growing list of works on contemporary China. While they treat of markedly different subjects and are of varying quality, all contribute to the store of information that is so necessary—and still so woefully inadequate—to an accurate understanding of the dynamics of the Chinese revolution.

The first is appropriately subtitled, "A Political and Economic Geography of the Chinese People's Republic." Those familiar with Mr. Shabad's previous book, *Geography of the USSR* (Columbia University Press, New York, N. Y., 1951) will find the same meticulous attention to detail and disciplined adherence to what can be proven from available evidence. This latest work is the richer for the author's background on Soviet Russia, which enables him to draw meaningful comparisons between the two regimes.

The general reader will find the author's summations in the first part of his study of special interest. They concisely sum up the complex trends that distinguished the first six years of Communist rule and are supplemented by carefully compiled tables of population and productivity. Although the author eschews editorial comment, his presentation of bare facts conjures up a host of political implications. On p. 4, for instance, the reader learns:

> **China borders on eleven nations . . . On Chinese maps . . . the Amur River Islands are shown as part of China . . . Soviet sources consider the Amur isles part of the Soviet Union. Near Manchouli begins the 2,700 mile-long border with Outer Mongolia. Although this frontier is delineated in detail on Soviet maps, giving the impression of accurate survey, it is labelled on Chinese maps "still to be delimited" and is drawn in rough outline . . . Until 1953 some Chinese maps showed all of the Pamirs as part of China. Since that time, the Chinese have withdrawn the line to the eastern margins of the highlands, in accordance with Soviet maps, and labelled it "still to be delimited."**

Such gleanings from painstaking research are worthy of attention as clues to potential expansionist tendencies on the part of Peiping. Similarly, a tracing of the points of difference between Communist Chinese and Burmese maps reveals that the former "still show Chinese jurisdiction over the upper reaches of the Irrawaddy River north of Myitkyina," and that both nations lay claim to the remote Wa (Kawa) States on the east bank of the Salween River. It is precisely these areas into which Chinese Communist troops moved during 1955–56, arousing increased concern in Rangoon over Peiping's interpretation of the so-called "Bandung spirit."

The turbulence of war and civil war, followed by Communist curbs on the flow of information to the outside world, made the gathering of Mr. Shabad's data exceedingly difficult, especially with respect to such remote though important areas as Tibet and Sinkiang. The author wisely refrains from speculation where the scanty evidence does not permit analysis. That he has been able to pack so much valuable information in his book is a tribute to his painstaking research and conscientious perusal of Chinese and Russian sources.

Dr. Wei's study, *China and Soviet Russia*, is of quite a different nature. As the author points out in his introduction, the book is chiefly a review of diplomatic events between the two countries, based on general Western and Chinese accounts. No Russian-language materials were consulted, nor does the author appear to have had access to Nationalist Chinese archives.

Mr. Whiting is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan, and author of *Soviet Policies in China 1917–1924* (Columbia University Press, N. Y., 1954).

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Although Dr. Wei differs from Mr. Shabad at some points concerning the nature of Sino-Soviet economic relations, both writers point to the vital importance of China's border regions—of Manchuria, Mongolia, and Sinkiang—in the relations between the two countries. Indeed Dr. Wei supplements Mr. Shabad's findings with some interesting historical background material showing the persistent efforts of Soviet negotiators to win concessions from China during the 1920–24 period in both Manchuria and Mongolia. By comparing the postwar treaties concluded between the USSR and the Nationalist Chinese Government with those later entered into between Moscow and Peiping, Dr. Wei traces continuing Soviet designs for maintaining spheres of influence behind the mask of Sino-Soviet friendship. Any such "friendship" runs afoul of what he believes to be "differences in basic cultural patterns of Russia and China as well as divergences of political and economic interests." (p. 328).

The most provocative of the three books is that by Dr. Liu. Its stimulating nature springs not from any partisan tone such as marks the study by Dr. Wei. Rather, it is because of the author's skillful handling of heretofore unexamined Chinese, German, Russian, Japanese, and English sources, which provide the reader with new insights into a critical aspect of contemporary China: the impact of military events upon political developments. Writing with detachment despite his previous experience as a Nationalist Army officer, the author offers a documented account which pleads no cause except that of a democratic China, free of authoritarian rule of whatever stamp.

A number of widely held beliefs are examined by Dr. Liu and found wanting in view of the evidence. Harking back to the early period of the Kuomintang-Communist coalition (1923–27), the author ascribes the success of the Northern Expedition of 1926 to the hard fighting and good generalship of the Kuomintang forces, while the Russian strategists and their Chinese cohorts first opposed the expedition and then worked to turn it to their own ends. Similarly, he refutes the charge that Nationalist troops never fought effectively by a careful study of the bitter battles against the Japanese, in particular the defense of Shanghai, Tei-erhchuang, and Chengchow. In the critical days of 1939, Japanese forces launched major offensive thrusts toward Chungking only to be defeated by General Li Tsung-jen. Three enemy assaults on Changsha, controlling the vital Canton-Hankow railway, proved futile thanks to the strong defense organized by General Hsueh Yueh.

Dr. Liu's study thus provides a counter-balance to some unduly low estimates of Chinese fighting ability based primarily on the closing years of the war. By that time, as the author points out, the cumulative handicaps of inadequate communications and supplies had seriously lowered the effectiveness of Nationalist troops. Allied commitments elsewhere and lengthy transport lines combined to limit the amount of matériel actually reaching Chiang's forces. Their low morale and weak condition aroused considerable criticism abroad, often with little understanding of the basic factors responsible for these failings and with little memory of the good fighting record demonstrated by Nationalist troops in the earlier years of combat.

Dr. Liu is not sparing in his criticism of the undue influence of Whampoa Military Academy graduates in the political life of the Nationalist regime and of the tendency to let personal associations take priority over political considerations. He attributes much of the difficulty encountered by the government of Chiang Kai-shek to these factors and to the obstacles which they created in the way of effective civilian rule. However, his account points up the large degree to which this was environmentally determined by the omnipresent Communist armed insurrection and by the Japanese military threat which steadily increased from 1931 to 1937.

One of the most interesting aspects of the book is its account of the three major programs of past foreign military assistance to Nationalist China. The first came from Moscow during the mid-1920's and laid the foundations of the Nationalist Army at the same time that it sought to subvert the rising military organization for Communist ends. The second came from Berlin during the following decade and, through one of history's strange paradoxes, was responsible for much of China's military effectiveness against Japan after 1937, by which time Japan had become Nazi Germany's partner under the Anti-Comintern Pact. The third effort was America's, when Generals Stilwell and Wedemeyer served as high-level military advisers to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek during World War II.

In view of present Communist Chinese subservience to Soviet military tutelage, it is interesting to assess the limitations of foreign military programs in China. Dr. Liu's book points up some basic problems which none of the past missions succeeded in overcoming. Foremost was the lack of experienced personnel at the higher command levels, so essential for building up a general staff of the calibre required by modern total warfare, which necessarily involves military usurpation of civilian responsibility in mobilizing manpower and resources.

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A second limitation upon foreign assistance resulted from attempts on the part of the grantors to impose their own command systems. Soviet advisers instituted political commissars, which was helpful in stimulating morale but harmful in terms of fixing command responsibility. German introduction of a Prussian-type military structure placed more power in the hands of the generals than their experience sometimes warranted. Finally, American insistence upon a unified Chinese military effort against Japan overlooked more than a decade of embittered struggle between the government and the Communist insurgents; and the firmly rooted American tradition of military divorcement from politics proved inoperable in the Chinese context.

As Dr. Liu points out in his epilogue, modern China, despite a succession of parliaments and constitutions, has largely been dominated by armed groups vying for power. The defeat of the provincial warlords in the Northern Expedition did not lead to their eclipse within the Nationalist government. Even more serious was Communist reliance upon armed insurrection as a means of perpetuating economic disorder, fomenting unrest, and eventually winning power.

With China split into two armed camps, victory in World War II proved a hollow triumph. Though willing to concede on subsidiary points in the postwar unification parleys with Nanking, the Communists refused to yield their military independence, and Soviet maneuvers in Manchuria permitted the re-equipment of their forces with captured Japanese arms. Communist victory in the ensuing conflict crushed whatever hopes existed for developing a responsible, elected government in China. Communist ascendancy led to the open enthronement of generals as civil administrators and fresh military ventures in Korea and Tibet.

Thus Dr. Liu's book is much more than a military history, in the usual sense of the term. It sheds new light on modern China's political and economic development, revealing with documentation and lucidity the far-reaching impact of military leaders and factors on a society in transition.

The Ideology of Soviet Patriotism

Frederick C. Barghoorn:
Soviet Russian Nationalism,
Oxford University Press,
London-New York, 1956, 330 pp.

Reviewed by Walter J. Kolarz

SOVIET Communist ideology as it existed on the morrow of Stalin's death was the product of a long, inward-looking period in Soviet history. The cultural and political isolationism of the last twenty-odd years of the Stalinist period had worked a profound transformation in the official doctrine. Marx and Engels, the founding fathers, had been relegated to a ritualistic and honorific position, their names still mentioned with reverence but their teachings reshaped, reinterpreted or expanded virtually beyond recognition.

To a large extent, this ideological transformation was conditioned by a recrudescence of nationalism wearing the new garb of "Soviet patriotism." This ambiguous and misleading term has itself changed in its ideological content according to the momentary tactical needs of the Soviet Communist Party. Broadly speaking, the term mirrors an attempt to wed two distinct loyalties: loyalty to the Soviet system and Communist ideology on the one hand, and loyalty to the nation and its historic traditions on the other. At times the major accent has been placed on the first; at others, on the second.

Mr. Kolarz is a British expert on Soviet nationality policy, author of *Russia and Her Colonies* (Praeger, N. Y., 1952), and *The Peoples of the Soviet Far East* (Praeger, N. Y., 1954).

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This equivocal notion and the shifting political reality which it circumscribes have found exhaustive treatment in *Soviet Russian Nationalism*, by Frederick C. Barghoorn, Associate Professor of Political Science at Yale University. Five years of firsthand experience in Soviet Russia, including travels to Transcaucasia and the Ukraine, countless interviews with Soviet refugees, and extensive research in primary and secondary sources have borne fruit in this work.

Professor Barghoorn draws up a most cautious, well-balanced inventory of the various factors which make up the ideology of Soviet patriotism. Russian domination of minority nationalities, Russian colonization of the non-Russian Soviet Republics, and the problem of linguistic russification must of necessity play a major part in an analysis of "Soviet patriotism." At the same time, as the author shows, much of this Russian bias developed in an accidental way, and Russian nationalism remains subordinate to Soviet patriotism (p. 59). The regime has satisfied Russian national interests to a much greater extent than the interests of the other ethnic groups of the USSR, but the bolshevized type of Russian nationhood which it created remains inacceptable to a genuine Russian nationalist. This frame of mind is illustrated by the revealing statement of a Soviet refugee who said: "I left the Soviet Union so that I could be a Russian" (p. 6). In the Soviet Union he could be a Russian only if he was prepared to identify himself simultaneously with the "Soviet people," another term which is devoid of any stable meaning. Occasionally it is almost synonymous with "Russian people," but often it connotes what is, in fact, a non-existent ideological community of the peoples of the USSR.

Indeed, the author estimates that "non-Russian national consciousness is a significant factor in the mental and spiritual make-up of forty to fifty percent of the Soviet population" (p. 116). That local and national differences and inherited attitudes still tenaciously survive in Soviet Russia, notwithstanding all efforts to build up the concept of Soviet patriotism, is frequently borne out by topical events—most recently, for instance, by the Georgian unrest in March 1956 following the Twentieth Congress vilification of Stalin.

Soviet patriotism need not be condemned *a priori* for the sole reason that it became increasingly colored by Russian culture and Russian history. Russia's cultural and historical past, like the past of any nation, contains both good and bad elements. The Soviet regime has tolerated some of the good elements—for instance, the humanism of the classics of Russian literature. But, as the author points out, it has also actively exploited some of the worst elements (p. 60).

A great deal that is primitive, narrow-minded, one-sided and chauvinistic in Russia's historical record has found reincarnation in the patriotic ideology of Soviet communism. The Russian territorial and cultural imperialism of the pan-Slavist, Danilevski, has been resuscitated along with the anti-Western bias of Dostoievski—of course without the mitigation of the latter's Christian message. Antisemitism, in the veiled form of a campaign against "cosmopolitanism," and crude admiration of militarism also have found their place in the concept of Soviet nationalism. Even the apocalyptic vision of the 16th century monk Filofei, who saw Moscow as the "Third Rome," has been endowed with a new meaning although one which retains its intolerant conceit and exclusivity (p. 255).

At the same time, Moscow plays an extremely practical role in the leveling-out process, on which the safety of every totalitarian multi-national state depends. The old antagonism between the Western St. Petersburg and the "genuinely Russian" Moscow of the Slavophiles has been decided in favor of the latter. There were moments when St. Petersburg-Leningrad, once the bulwark of Westernism, appeared even more chauvinistic-Russian than Moscow itself (p. 240). Only as the home of anti-totalitarian moods which are not necessarily identical with pro-Western leanings has Leningrad retained some traces of a challenging alternative to Moscow.

Moscow stands for centralism, *par excellence*, and it would be fascinating to elaborate on its functions in Soviet nationality policy—not that abstract "Moscow" synonymous with communism and Soviet power, but the living capital city which, in the author's words, absorbs and adjusts "the most aggressive, forceful and ruthless individuals of all parts of the country" (p. 137). No capital city of the free world can aspire to such a domineering position as that of Moscow, which sets the pace of Soviet life. Moscow produces the Russianized and yet, to a certain extent, supranational stereotype of the *Homo Sovieticus*. The political mechanism which Soviet Moscow serves quickly obliterates the original national and regional consciousness of newcomers to its portals. This distinguishes Moscow from imperial Vienna, where Czechs, Yugoslavs and Poles always retained their national individuality and their determination to express it. It distinguishes Moscow even from Paris, the capital city of a centralistic but democratic state. The members of the well-organized societies of the Auvergnats,

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Savoyards and Bretons in Paris stubbornly refuse to be submerged in the anonymity of the Parisian melting pot.

A great deal of current Soviet ideological thinking appears crude and primitive, but some of the premises on which it is based betray a considerable degree of sophistication. Prof. Barghoorn rightly points to the capability of the Communist leaders in applied psychology and sociology (p. 268). As practical psychologists, they recognize the tendency of many Russians to be fascinated by foreign ways and ideas, a tendency toward "servility to things foreign" to speak in the Soviet jargon. They have tried to counteract this tendency not only by terror and intimidation, but also by inculcating into the people an ethnocentric concept in which the feeling of one's own superiority is as characteristic as the feeling of hatred toward the surrounding world. This animosity has its roots in the class hatred implicit in Marxist doctrine, but it has been blended with the chauvinistic hatred of super-patriotism.

To borrow the terminology of the French writer Raymond Aron, the Soviet rulers have devised for their own protection a Manichean division of the world, says the author (p. 183). They themselves represent the most advanced culture, the future of mankind, in short the empire of light; the Western nations represent the shrinking and decaying empire of darkness. For a long time this Manichean dogma was kept alive by spurious historical scholarship and hate propaganda, but now Stalin's successors are trying to emancipate themselves from the exaggerations of this Manichaeism. The most drastic excesses of xenophobia and isolationism seem to be receding into the background.

Professor Barghoorn's valuable study of the nationalistic ingredients of the nationalist-Marxist synthesis which Soviet communism seems to have achieved deserves particular attention at a time when other non-Soviet Communist systems are acquiring greater weight within the camp of world communism. As long as nationalistic elements persist as an integral part of Soviet communism, they will act as a barrier to the development of world communism beyond a diplomatic coalition and an economic block. This does not diminish world communism's dangerous character, but it deprives it of a higher ideological content. If Professor Barghoorn's analysis were matched by a similar study of the anatomy of Chinese Communist nationalism, we might find evidence of a deep-lying ideological cleavage within the Communist camp—a cleavage bridged only superficially by common hatreds, short-term political interests, and a common adherence to Marxist-Leninist scholasticism.

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Editors' Note: Readers are welcome to send communications dealing with matters discussed in *Problems of Communism*. Letters should be addressed to the Editors, *Problems of Communism*, U. S. Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W., Washington 25, D. C.

TRANSFORMATION IN RUSSIA?

A reading of Marshall D. Shulman's interesting article "Is the Soviet Union Changing?" [Issue No. 3, 1956] suggests that Mr. Shulman has treated the real nature of the changes which have taken place in the USSR since Stalin's death perhaps too lightly.

His assertion that the recent measures adopted in the USSR, in both the foreign and domestic fields, follow the "cyclical pattern . . . [of] the four decades of Soviet history" cannot be accepted uncritically. The evidence seems to indicate the contrary: that although the changes are being introduced gradually—in order not to jar the convictions carefully inculcated over the past 38 years—they are radically transforming the very essence of Soviet life. The condemnation of the coercive methods used during the Soviet Union's entire preliminary formative period, the end of the "revolutionary tension" under which the Soviet citizens had been living, is symptomatic of the scope of the change. Whether we like it or not, and what is more, whether certain Soviet or Western Communist leaders themselves like it or not, we are seeing the emergence of the Thermidor of the Russian Revolution. There appears to be no "mirage of changes," but a real evolution of Soviet society, made necessary as much by the internal fermentation of liberal ideas, especially among the young people, as by the new international situation.

Mr. Shulman is no doubt right in expatiating on the rise of the class of intellectuals and technicians, of that category of Soviet citizens which, within the framework of the Five-Year Plans, seems to be playing an ever greater role in the building of USSR policy. Actually, the promoters of this policy are not concerned much about the subtleties of Marxist theory, for to them Marxism is not a theory but the very infrastructure of their culture and of the environment in which they move. Soviet eyes are fixed principally on the achievement graphs in all fields of national life.

Nor does this group of intellectuals and technicians form an intermediate echelon between the party and the mass of citizens, for its members are automatically incorporated into the cadres of the party as they are deemed able to assume responsibility. This seems to be just as true for the military. The party is thus still the great coordinator of Soviet Life, and its influence extends over all the activities of public life. Soviet society rests on a solid industrial framework, which has cost its people heavy sacrifices. Proud of their accomplishments in the technical, cultural and scientific fields, the Soviet people can finally shake off the "revolutionary tension" under which they have been living and permit themselves to enjoy the advantages afforded by the results obtained thus far. The new policies now adopted in the Soviet Union are nothing more than the products of the country's and the party's evolution. Khrushchev and Bulganin are thus as much the spokesmen for as the initiators of a transformation which has taken forty years to mature.

By deliberately rejecting this desire for change, even though it has as yet benefited only a part of the Soviet public, are we not running the risk of promoting the opposite trend, whose roots are bound to be still deep in the USSR?

Paris, France **C. Zarnekau**

ACCOLADES

Many thanks for sending me *Problems of Communism*. It is truly an excellent publication. I was particularly impressed by Mr. Gliksman's article "New Trends in Soviet Labor Policy" [No. 4, 1956], which I will certainly make use of in my journalistic work. I have already drawn the magazine to the attention of my colleagues.

Stockholm, Sweden **Paul Olberg**

A REFERENCE

In a review of "Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought" [No. 5, 1956], Rev. Henri Chambre remarks that: ". . . it would be particularly interesting to see what the various forms of Soviet law, particularly civil law and penal law, owe to Russian and Roman law."

May I refer the reader to an excellent study by Professor N. S. Timasheff in the December 1953 issue (vol. XII, No. 4) of the *American Slavic and East European Review*, entitled "Russian Penal Law: Imperial and Soviet" for an answer to some of the questions raised by Fr. Chambre.

New York, N. Y. **Serge L. Levitsky**
[*Assistant Professor, Fordham University*]

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